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The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?
Robert W. Kastenmeier*
and Michael J. Remington**
[CHARMAN] KAsTENMEIER [D]o you think society would be bet-
ter served if the law responds to changes as they occur, or tries to an-
ticipate them? ...
[PROFESSOR] COMPAiNE: I think to try to anticipate change is fu-
tile. It is a real swamp .... 3
[REPRESENTATIVE] MAZOLI: I am beginning to think of some
dank forest, [where] if you take a wrong step you will get sucked up
by quicksand .... 2
[REPRESENTATIVE] SAWYER: I think you correctly described it
when you said it was a kind of a swamp. Since I have been in Con-
gress, I have never gotten involved in anything that was more com-
plex and more defying of an intelligent solution that satisfied all of
the questions.
3
* Member of Congress; Chairman of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice.
** Chief Counsel of the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice.
The views expressed herein are the authors' own and do not represent the
views of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Rep-
resentatives.
The authors are indebted to Richard Stern, Dorothy Schrader, and Wil-
liam Patry for constructive comments and sage advice on previous drafts. Of
course, any errors, omissions or distortions are the responsibility of the
authors.
1. Copyright and Technological Change: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983) (remarks by Rep. Rob-
ert W. Kastenmeier; statement by Benjamin M. Compaine, Program on Infor-
mation Resources Policy, Harvard University) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change].
2. Id. at 25 (remarks by Rep. Romano Mazzoli).
3. Id at 26 (remarks by Rep. Harold Sawyer).
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INTRODUCTION
The congressional debate reflected in the above remarks,
although arising during the midsummer of 1983 in the larger
context of "copyright and technological change," accurately de-
picted the political landscape that existed when consideration
of semiconductor chip legislation began early in the 98th Con-
gress.4 Members of Congress not only conjured up visions of
swamps and quicksand, but also spoke of being "trapped in a
technological snake pit.' '5
Although representatives expressed trepidation, the chal-
lenge presented by the inquiry into highly technological issues
also evoked optimism and resolve. Members of Congress were
admonished that "[w]hen you are working on the cutting edge
of technology, the main thing is to stay behind the blade.'' 6
Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., spoke for the optimists
when he observed:
Perhaps we are... like Balboa. ._. "Silent upon a peak in Darien."
When Balboa first saw the Pacific Ocean, that great South Sea, he
could hardly have known what he was seeing. A great sheet of water
lay before him, but what it was, how far it extended, what shores it
lapped and what it meant were all matters of conjecture. That is
more like our situation. We know that we are on the edge of a great
unknown .... 7
The congressional mindset existing during the 98th Con-
gress reflected these competing feelings of optimism and pessi-
mism, and contrary desires to move forward or backward. Out
of this tension came a constructive and favorable environment
for consideration of semiconductor chip legislation.8 Congress,
in a spirit of optimism, moved forward. Technological creativ-
4. Cohodas, New Technology Put Strains on Old Laws, 42 CONG. Q., 135,
136-37 (1984); How To Change Copyright Laws to Deal with the New Technolo-
gies, BROADCASTING, July 25, 1983, at 29; Greenhouse, Panel Reconsiders U.S.
Copyright Law, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at All, col. 1.
5. Cohodas, supra note 4, at 135 (quoting Rep. Dan Glickman).
6. Appendix I, Materials from Congressional Copyright and Technology
Symposium, Fort Lauderdale, FL, February 4-6, 1984, House Hearings on
Copyright and Technological Change, supra note 1, at 169 (summary of Rap-
porteur Paul Goldstein) [Rapporteur Goldstein's summary will be cited here-
inafter as Goldstein Summary, Congressional Copyright and Technology
Symposium and the Symposium materials as Congressional Copyright and
Technology Symposium].
7. See id. at 173 (remarks by Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.); see also
Goldstein Summary, id at 166.
8. In the American justice system, tension often works in a constructive
way. See Remington, Circuit Council Reform.. A Boat Hook for Judges and
Court Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 698.
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ity was met by legislative innovation. A freestanding or sui
generis system of protection for semiconductor chip products
was developed. Congress added a new chapter to Title 17 of the
United States Code 9-a unique provision that does not amend
any part of existing copyright law-and thereby charted a new
course for American intellectual property law.
This Article discusses the fundamental choices that Con-
gress had to make in processing the Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act of 1984. The Article begins with a survey of the
legislative landscape existing at the time of the Act's passage,
including a magnified view of the constitutional bases of the
legislation, its legislative history, and the need for the legisla-
tion given the unique characteristics of the semiconductor chip
industry. The Article then develops a five-part political test for
assessing the merits of proposed intellectual property legisla-
tion in areas of new technology, and demonstrates how the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act fulfilled the requirements
of this test. In addition, the Article discusses how the Act deals
with international aspects of chip protection. Finally, the Arti-
cle identifies the salient lessons to be learned from the Act and
the Act's precedential value for American intellectual property
law, especially as it relates to other new technologies.
I. LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE
In enacting the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
Congress created the first significant intellectual property right
in nearly one hundred years.' 0 The significance of extending
proprietary protection to semiconductor chip products" was
recognized during House floor debate by Representatives Don
Edwards and Norman Y. Mineta, the semiconductor chip bill's
9. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III,
98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984)).
10. Congress created the last new form of statutory intellectual property
in 1881, when it passed the Trademark Act. Ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881). Initial
congressional attempts to create a statutory system of trademarks-repre-
sented by the Trademark Acts of 1870, 1871 and 1876-failed due to a finding
of constitutional invalidity by the United States Supreme Court. See The
Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (holding the copyright clause, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, does not permit trademarks to be protected as writ-
ings). Subsequent trademark laws have been based on congressional power to
regulate commerce.
11. Semiconductor chips, as such, are not protected under the Act.
Rather, "mask works," which embody the design of the semiconductor chip,
see infra notes 68 and 90 and accompanying text, are given protection; see also
infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
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chief sponsors in the House,12 and was underlined by President
Reagan on November 8, 1984,13 when he signed the Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 into law as Public Law 98-
620.14 The President aptly observed: "By strengthening the
rights of people who are willing to risk commercializing new
ideas to reap their just rewards, this legislation encourages indi-
viduals to create and develop new technologies.' u5
A. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR THE ACT
It is uncontestably within Congress's power to modify,
amend, or expand this nation's intellectual property laws. The
Constitution confers this authority when it states, "[tihe Con-
gress shall have Power ... to Promote the Progress of Science
and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their Writings and Dis-
coveries."'16
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act was grounded in
this constitutional authority. Both the House and Senate pre-
mised their legislation on a clear finding that original mask
works17 are "writings" within the meaning of Article I, section
8, clause 8.18 To avoid constitutional challenges on the issue of
whether mask works are protectable as "writings," however,
12. See 130 CONG. REC. H11,613-14 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984); see also id. at
H11,610 (remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) ("The fundamental import of
[the chip legislation] is that it recognizes industrial property as a right.").
13. Although the President's signing statement is dated November 9, 1984,
see injfra note 15, the actual date of signing was November 8, 1984, in Santa
Barbara, California. The bill was probably signed late in the day; the state-
ment was issued the next day. The statement was inadvertently omitted from
the relevant issue of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, but
will nonetheless appear in the Public Papers of the Presidents. Telephone in-
terview with Ronald Geisler, Executive Clerk, White House (Nov. 22, 1985).
14. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 was passed as Title III
of Public Law 98-620, entitled Federal District Court Organization Act of 1984.
See Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 301, 98 Stat. 3335, 3347 (1984).
15. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Presi-
dent (Nov. 9, 1984) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See infra note 87 and accompanying text for a definition of a mask
work.
18. See Copyright Protection for Semiconductor Chips: Hearings on H.R.
1028 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 171
(1983) (statement of Dorothy Schrader, Associate Register of Copyrights for
Legal Affairs, Copyright Office) [Ms. Schrader's statement will be cited here-
inafter as Schrader Statement, 1983 House Hearings and the Committee's
hearings as 1983 House Hearings].
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the Act also sets forth a commerce limitation, so that only
piracy "in or affecting commerce" is circumscribed.19 This pre-
caution, found unnecessary in the House Report but insisted
upon by the Senate, was characterized as "suspenders" and
used to better support the legislation.20
Congress's decision to base the Semiconductor Chip Protec-
tion Act on both the copyright and the commerce clauses re-
flects not only a decision to bolster the legislation, but also a
concern that the Act not breach constitutional parameters of
either the commerce or the copyright clauses. Former Repre-
sentative, now Judge Abner Mikva has emphasized Congress's
obligation to respect the Constitution, stating that members of
Congress "should remember that their constitutional oath is
not just a ceremonial ritual but an entrusting to their care of a
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 910(a) (Supp. II 1984).
20. See H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 n.36, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5750, 5765 n.36 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT] (All
citations to the House Report are to the star print. United States Code Con-
gressional and Administrative News contains the initial version of the House
Report. The star print corrected typographical errors in the initial version and
contains three additional pages.). As stated by Professor Arthur Miller, "the
use of two constitutional clauses to protect a copyrighted work is nothing more
than using a belt and suspenders to protect that work." The Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1201 Before the Subcomm. on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1983) (statement of Arthur Miller, Professor of Law,
Harvard University) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Hearings]. Professor
Melville Nimmer agrees with this thought: '"The possibility exists that if Con-
gress were to enact copyright legislation in a manner which exceeded the au-
thority of the Copyright Clause, authority to do so might be found under the
Commerce Clause." 1 M. NIMMER, NIlMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.09, at 1-60
(1985); see also Hearings on Copyright Law Revision Before Subcomm. No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Part I, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 259 (1965) (re-
marks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier).
As a general proposition, American patent and copyright law has avoided
using suspenders when only a belt is necessary. See Schrader Statement, 1983
House Hearings, supra note 18, at 108 ("Congress has never enacted a copy-
right law based on the Interstate Commerce Clause."); see also 1983 House
Hearings, supra note 18, at 234-35 (letter to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier from
Robert C. Denicola, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska). An express
legislative finding that a statute is rooted in the patent and copyright clause of
the Constitution has been sufficient to withstand attacks of constitutional in-
firmity. Schrader Statement, id. at 171.
The Act, by requiring an interstate commerce nexus, may create more
work for the federal judiciary. Problems of proof will inevitably occur and
constitutional challenges may be muddied by factual disputes concerning
whether commerce has been affected. There is not a single case that stands
for the theory that the commerce clause would sustain a finding of constitu-
tional validity if the copyright and patent clause was insufficient. See 1 M.
Nmm, supra, § 1.09, at 1-60.
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document that gives this republic its unique longevity."2 1 Con-
gress, by relying on the commerce clause as an alternative con-
stitutional basis for the semiconductor chip legislation, has
taken seriously this caretaking responsibility.
Congress's power to regulate intellectual property is sub-
ject to other limitations in addition to the commerce limitation
and "writings" requirement. Congress must also consider the
public benefit derived from conferring protection on a particu-
lar interest. The Supreme Court has stated that the monopoly
privileges that Congress may confer on creators of intellectual
property "are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to pro-
vide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved." 22 In other words, the primary objective of the intel-
lectual property laws is not to reward the author or inventor,
but rather to secure for the public the benefits derived from
the labors of authors and inventors.23 This objective is achieved
by giving authors and inventors an incentive to create. The law
21. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitu-
tion , 61 N.C.L. REV. 587, 611 (1983); see also Brest, The Conscientious Legisla-
tor's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
22. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984);
accord, United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (same as to
patents); see also Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 649, 649 (1947) ("the furtherance of the public interest has been a basic
premise [of the patent system]"). This principle appears to have first been
stated in Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 9 (1829).
23. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 20, § 1.03[A], at 1-30.2; see also Nimmer, New
Technology and the Law of Copyright Reprography and Computers-Fore-
word, 15 UCLA L. REV. 931, 932 (1968) (discussing the public right "to fully
exploit the marvels of the new technology"); Samuelson, CONTU Revisited:
The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-
Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 749 ("[Ihe content of a copyrighted work
has always had some nonfunctional aesthetic, informational, or entertaining
qualities which are communicated to a human audience." (emphasis in origi-
nal)).
The House Report accompanying the 1909 revisions to the copyright law
clearly expressed this idea:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the
terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the
author has in his writings, for the Supreme Court has held that such
rights as he has are purely statutory rights, but upon the ground that
the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and
useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods
the exclusive rights to their writings. The Constitution does not es-
tablish copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to
grant such rights if it thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit of the
author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are
given. Not that any particular class of citizens, however worthy, may
benefit, but because the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the
[Vol. 70:417
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gives the creator exclusive control over the creation for a lim-
ited period of time, after which it enters the public domain.2
The public arguably benefits at least twice from this bargain:
first when the original invention or expression is created and
made available to the public, and second when the term of pro-
tection expires and the creation is added to the public domain.
The framers assigned to Congress, the most politically rep-
resentative of the three branches of government, the role of de-
fining the scope of the limited monopolies granted to authors
and inventors in exchange for public access to their creations.25
The framers therefore envisioned a political balancing of equi-
ties between the public interest and the proprietary rights of
creators.2 6 Congress struck that balance when it enacted the
first patent and copyright laws.27 As changes occurred and new
technologies were developed, Congress adjusted the patent and
copyright laws to incorporate new subject matters28 and to
great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention, to
give some bonus to authors and inventors.
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider, as has been
already stated, two questions: First, how much will the legislation
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how
much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The
granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and condi-
tions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the
temporary monopoly.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). Similar language occurs in
the Senate Report. See S. REP. No. 1108, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
24. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
25. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. Representative Bruce Morrison expressed a similar political thought
on the House floor: "The congressional role, then, is to define the scope of the
monopoly granted to the creator in order to serve as an incentive to the crea-
tion of new works for the benefit of the public. Clearly this necessitates a bal-
ancing of interests." 130 CONG. REC. H9296 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Morrison) (debate on audio "first sale" legislation).
27. The first patent and copyright laws were enacted during the 1st Con-
gress. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 109, 124 (1790).
28. For an overview of the history of patent and copyright legislation, see
1 E. LIPSCOMB, WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:1-1:9 (3d ed. 1984); A. LATMAN, THE
COPYRIGHT LAW: HowELL's COPYRIGHT LAw REVISED AND THE 1976 AcT 4-14
(5th ed. 1979). Before 1976, the last revision to copyright laws was the Copy-
right Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075. Congress revised the 1909 Act in the Act of
Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). The 1976 Act contained many signifi-
cant revisions, including a single federal system of protection for all "original
works of authorship," a single term of protection with an inalienable option in
individual authors to permit termination, more flexible notice provisions, crea-
tion of a compulsory license for cable television, and recognition of fair use
limitations on exclusive rights. A. LATMAN, supra, at 12-13.
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redefine the balance between public and proprietary interests.2
In rare situations, however, it may not be possible for Congress
to incorporate a new subject matter into the existing intellec-
tual property framework without fundamentally altering the
balance inherent in those laws. For example, the changes nec-
essary to accommodate the new subject matter might distort
the existing law to such a degree that it threatens to upset the
balance struck for other protected works. Similarly, the bal-
ance between public and proprietary rights reflected in existing
law may be inappropriate for the new subject matter. In such
cases it may be necessary for Congress to establish a sui generis
system of protection. That was in fact the solution Congress
adopted when faced with the problem of providing protection
for semiconductor chips.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act represents six
years of congressional effort that spanned three Congresses. In
terms of the legislative clock, six years is a relatively short pe-
riod in which to achieve successful enactment of a statute, espe-
cially when the problem is highly technological and requires a
novel solution. Perhaps the most fundamental political
message behind the passage of the Act is that Congress is insti-
tutionally able to consider and ultimately vote upon thorny
technological problems. Admittedly, "Congress does not initi-
ate policy easily, but... given sufficient cause and provocation,
it rises to the challenge. '30
Congress originally considered protecting semiconductor
chip products by incorporating them in copyright law. In 1979,
during the 96th Congress, the House Copyright Subcommittee
held a one-day hearing on the matter in San Jose, California.31
The legislation then pending was short and simple. Consisting
of only one sentence, H.R. 1007 would have added the following
language to the definition of "[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural
29. To satisfy its constitutional mandate to balance interests, Congress
may have to spend more time in hearings on such legislation, solicit the views
of a wider spectrum of individuals and interests, consider more amendments,
and spend more time in debate than would normally be the case.
30. A. MIKVA & P. SARIS, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH
367 (1983).
31. See Copyright Protection for Imprinted Design Patterns on Semicon-
ductor Chips: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings].
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works" protected by copyright law: "Such pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works shall also include the photographic masks
used to imprint patterns on integrated circuit chips and the im-
printed patterns themselves even though they are used in con-
nection with the manufacture of, or incorporated in a useful
article. '32 The brevity of this language was matched by the
measure's short lifespan. The proposed legislation generated
substantial controversy among copyright experts and within the
semiconductor industry itself. If anything, the San Jose hear-
ing revealed that there were no quick and easy legislative fixes
to intellectual property questions caused by complex new
technologies.
The 1979 proposal was controversial for a number of rea-
sons. First, it violated a fundamental tenet of copyright law
that states that copyright does not protect useful or utilitarian
articles standing alone. This rule, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 10133
and consistently followed by the courts, s 4 specifies that copy-
right protects the design of a useful article only to the extent
that artistic features can be identified separately and indepen-
dently from the utilitarian components of the copyrighted arti-
cle.35 Copyright only protects expressions, and not ideas, plans
or processes. 36 Any proposed legislation, therefore, would have
32. H.R. 1007, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in id. at 3-4. The pro-
posed legislation was a direct outgrowth of an attempt by Intel Corporation in
a mandamus action filed in Federal court to compel the Register of Copyrights
to accept for deposit two chips as the published form of previously filed plastic
sheets, which were photocopies of masks for a chip. The case was settled after
the commencement of the interrogatory and deposition process. The Copy-
right Office refused to accept the chip as the "published" form of the plastic
sheets. See Barker, Copyright for Integrated Circuit Designs: Will the 1976
Act Protect Against Chip Pirates?, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 817, 842 (1983).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
34. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1,
18 (1907) (holding that perforated rolls for player pianos do not violate com-
posers' statutory rights); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) ('"Te use of
the art is a totally different thing from a publication of a book explaining it.
The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive rights to
make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such
book.").
35. See Schrader Statement, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 88-89;
see also Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.) ("Articles
intended for practiced use in cooperation with a machine are not copyright-
able."), cerL denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947); Taylor Instruments Co. v. Fawley-
Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding charts used to record
thermometer readings were not subject to copyright protection), cerL denied,
321 U.S. 785 (1944).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 901(c) (Supp. II 1984)
(same as to semiconductor chip protection).
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to address squarely the potential problems created by allowing
copyright protection of a useful article.3 7 A second basis for op-
position to the 1979 proposal concerned the issue of reverse en-
gineering. H.R. 1007 threatened to expose members of the
industry to legal liability, perhaps criminal liability, for per-
forming a standard industry practice-electronically dissecting
new chips to see if unique processes were employed. 3 Finally,
the bill did not define "integrated circuit chips" or "imprinted
patterns" and did not adequately anticipate new chip produc-
tion technologies. All of these problems would have to be con-
sidered in greater detail and resolved in a satisfactory manner
before any legislation could be passed.3 9
Very little happened during the 97th Congress until late
1982, when new bills were introduced in the House and Sen-
ate.40 These measures, in contrast to their predecessor, exten-
sively amended the Copyright Act to protect mask works in
their own right. The proposals were clearer in definitional
scope and grappled for the first time with the concept of re-
verse engineering. Both persisted in using copyright as the ba-
sis for protecting mask works, despite the fact that mask works
were useful articles. No formal action on these bills occurred
in either the House or Senate. These proposals did, however,
37. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 12 (statement of Jon
Baumgarten, General Counsel, Copyright Office); id. at 52-53 (statement of
John Finch, Vice-President and General Manager, National Semiconductor
Corp.).
38. In 1979, at the time of the House hearing, it was thought that chip
manufacturers would uniformly support the pending legislation. However, on
the issue of reverse engineering, the industry split into two opposing camps:
Intel and Mostek supported H.R. 1007; Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corpo-
ration, National Semiconductor Corporation, and Texas Instruments opposed
the bill. See 1979 House Heaings, supra note 31, at 31 (statement of L.J.
Sevin, President, Mostek Corp.); i&. at 31-32 (statement of Andrew Grove,
President, Intel Corp.); id. at 51 (statement of John Finch, Vice-President and
General Manager, National Semiconductor Corp.); id. at 57 (statement of
James M. Early, Director of Research and Development, Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp.); id. at 77 (statement of George H. Heilmeier, Vice-Presi-
dent, Corporate Research, Development, and Engineering, Texas Instru-
ments); see also Barker, supra note 32, at 842-44 (describing the advantages
and injustices of reverse engineering).
39. At the termination of the hearing, the bill's chief sponsor, Representa-
tive Don Edwards, observed: "We've certainly not come far enough in the
hearing to even come close to a definitive answer." Electronic News, Apr. 23,
1979, at 1, col. 1, at 76, col. 5.
40. See H.R. 7207, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced by Rep. Don Ed-
wards, 128 CONG. REC. H7939 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1982)); S. 3117, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982) (introduced by Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., 128 CONG. REC.
S15,484 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982)).
[Vol. 70:417
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
provide a foundation for bills sponsored early in the next
Congress.
During the 98th Congress, companion bills were introduced
in the House and Senate,41 and the relevant subcommittees sig-
nalled their intention to consider the issue of copyright protec-
tion for semiconductor chips. The House and Senate held
hearings early and ultimately compiled extensive hearings
records on the subject.4 At the initial mark-up stage, the Sen-
ate subcommittee opted to retain an approach rooted in copy-
right; the House Copyright Subcommittee, on the other hand,
decided to develop a free standing or sui generis form of protec-
tion.43 The two bills then followed a routine legislative course
in both the House and Senate: the bills were debated and voted
upon in full committee, committee reports were filed," and
both bodies then debated and voted on the bills on the floor.
45
The different bills passed unanimously in both the House and
Senate.46 Although unanimous support for different bills re-
flected a widespread feeling that the subject of inadequate pro-
tection for semiconductor chips deserved congressional
attention, there nonetheless appeared to be few strong feelings
on how the solution should be framed.47 Unanimous House
41. See H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H643-44 (daily ed.
Feb. 24, 1983) (introduced by Reps. Don Edwards and Norman Mineta, 129
CONG. REC. H201 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983)); S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. S5992-93 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (introduced by Sens. Charles McC.
Mathias, Jr., and Gary Hart, 129 CONG. REC. S5991 (daily ed. May 4, 1983)).
42. See generally 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18; 1983 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 20.
43. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 5-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5754-56. Compare S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 130
CONG. REC. S5837-38 (daily ed. May 16, 1984) (copyright approach) with H.R.
5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed. June 11, 1984)
(sui generis approach). For a chart comparing the two bills see HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 20, at 39-41.
44. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5750; S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as SEN-
ATE REPORT]. Although the Senate Report discusses the House sui generis ap-
proach, see id. at 12-14, the Senate hearing record is devoid of debate on the
issue. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 20.
45. On May 16, 1984, the Senate, after accepting a technical amendment,
passed S. 1201 by voice vote. See 130 CONG. REC. S5837-38 (daily ed. May 16,
1984). To review the debate, see id. at S5833-38.
On June 11, 1984, the House passed H.R. 5525, under suspension of the
rules, by a roll call vote of 388 to 0. See 130 CONG. REC. H5524 (daily ed. June
11, 1984). To review the debate, see id. at H5489-97.
46. See supra note 45.
47. If there had been strong convictions in the House, these feelings
would have either been alluded to during floor debate or registered in the
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
support for a sui generis bill was proof that such an approach
could be developed and, if judged fair and effective, could ulti-
mately become the vehicle for enactment of a public law.
After passage of the respective bills, a parliamentary glitch
occurred that may confuse those studying the history of the
chip legislation. The House, in deference to earlier passage of
the Senate bill, endorsed its own bill and then by unanimous
consent took the Senate bill from the Speaker's table, struck
out the bill's text, and inserted the text of the House bill.48
The Senate bill, as amended, was then passed by the House.49
This typical parliamentary maneuver was an obligatory step in
setting the stage for a conference between the House and
Senate.5o
The House, however, did not immediately request a formal
conference, allowing the two bodies to engage in informal nego-
tiations.51 In fact, the more formal conference approach was
never required because an agreement was reached between the
House and Senate subcommittees in mid-September of 1984.
Although the accord was based on the sui generis House bill, it
form of a negative vote on the legislation. Not a single member of the House
spoke in favor of the Senate approach during floor consideration and there
was not a "no" vote cast on the legislation. During the Senate debate, a brief
discussion of the House bill occurred when Senators Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
and Patrick Leahy cautioned their colleagues about the merits of the House
approach. See 130 CONG. REC. S5833, S5836-37 (daily ed. May 16, 1984). No
senator rose in support of the House bill on the Senate floor. An optimistic
vote was registered by Senator Patrick Leahy, who observed: "Both commit-
tees have put in a lot of hard work on this effort, and I am confident that we
will not allow our differences to stand in the way of an effective piece of legis-
lation in this Congress." Id- at S5837.
Lack of conviction among members of Congress about which approach to
take should not be misunderstood to mean that the difference between a copy-
right and a sui generis approach was only a war of words. The House Report
is clear on the issue, stating that there would be "formidable philosophical,
constitutional, legal and technical problems associated with any attempt to
place protection for mask works or semiconductor chip designs under the
copyright law . . . ." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 10, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5759. See also Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intel-
lectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Pro-
grams, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473-74 (1985).
48. See 130 CONG. REC. H5489, H5524-25 (daily ed. June 11, 1984).
49. See ic. at H5524.
50. Both houses had passed differently worded versions of the same bill,
so that a conference was permissible.
51. The conference committee is generally convened as a last resort. A.
MIKVA & P. SARIS, supra note 30, at 240. The executive branch, the Copyright
Office, the Legislative Counsels' Offices in the House and Senate, and repre-
sentatives of the Semiconductor Industry Association and the Association of
American Publishers assisted in the compromise process.
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also contained drafting improvements offered by the Senate,
which made the final version even more unique in approach.
5 2
Despite having the chip compromise in hand, the Senate
leadership was still unable to call up the bill for consideration.
The 98th Congress had entered into its final days, and the fre-
netic beat of impending presidential and congressional elections
controlled the tempo. Unwilling to let a good deal of hard
work come to nothing, several senators requested that an omni-
bus court reform/intellectual property bill be scheduled. 53 The
chip measure would be the primary piece of legislation and all
the other bills, with one exception,54 would be measures that
previously had been approved by the House Committee on the
Judiciary and also had received a majority vote on the House
floor.55 The packaging maneuver proved successful and the
chip bill ultimately became part of a Senate amendment to
H.R. 6163,6 an unrelated bill to create several places for hold-
ing federal court. The omnibus bill was unanimously endorsed,
52. Explanation of the House-Senate compromise, contained in the Senate
amendment, is found in an explanatory memorandum submitted into the rec-
ord by Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. during floor debate. See Explana-
tory Memorandum-Mathias-Leahy Amendment to S. 1201, 130 CONG. REC.
S12,916 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Mathias-Leahy Explana-
tory Memorandum]. A similar document was introduced during House floor
consideration. See Explanatory Memorandum of the Senate Amendment to
H.R. 6163, Title III, as Considered by the House of Representatives, 130 CONG.
REC. E4432 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (introduced by Rep. Kastenmeier) [herein-
after cited as House Explanatory Memorandum]. For the most part, the ex-
planatory memoranda track each other's language. The Senate explanation,
however, is lengthier, and the House document relies heavily on the House
Report, which provided the foundation for the final version of the bill. Com-
pare id. with HOUsE REPORT, supra note 20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5750.
53. Consequently, the chip protection legislation became Title III of a
court reform/intellectual property bill, H.R. 6163, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. H11,602-05 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984).
54. The exception involved government patent policy amendments, which
had been favorably reported by the House Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy. See 130 CONG. REC. H11,614 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Don
Fuqua). See generally id. at H11,615 (remarks of Rep. Doug Walgren) (ex-
plaining government patent policy amendments). -
55. See 130 CONG. REC. H11,608 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984) (remarks of Rep.
Robert Kastenmeier); id at H11,612-13 (remarks of Rep. Carlos Moorhead).
Other titles of the Senate amendment related to Trademark Act clarification
(Title I); creation of a State Justice Institute (Title II); federal courts improve-
ments (including elimination of statutory civil priorities, district court organi-
zation, and amendments to the Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982)
(Title IV); and government research and patent policy (Title V). Id
56. H.R. 6163, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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first by the Senate and then by the House.57 On November 8,
1984, two days after the national election, President Reagan
signed the bill into law. s
C. SEMICONDUCTOR CHIPS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
The congressional perspective of proposals for statutory
change is commonly referred to as a "big picture" view. Special
interests are represented, but the usual rule is that Congress
will ultimately consider the general welfare of the entire coun-
try. To visualize the broader congressional vista for any partic-
ular bill, one must use a wide angle lens of societal, economic,
and technological change.5 9
57. The Senate passed H.R. 6163, as amended, on October 3, 1984. See 130
CONG. REc. S12,930 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984). The House passed the bill, as
amended by the Senate, on October 9, 1984, by a roll call vote of 363 to 0. See
130 CONG. REC. H11,598 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984).
Before taking the bill to the House floor, the House Committee on Rules
fashioned a resolution setting forth a procedure pursuant to which the bill
could be considered. See H.R. Res. 606, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC.
H11,595 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984). The rule, fashioned by Rules Committee
Chairman Claude Pepper and Representative Joseph Moakley, floor manager
for the Committee on Rules, provided for an up-or-down vote, with no amend-
ments on the Senate amendment to the House bill. See 130 CONG. REc.
H11,595 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984). Representative Trent Lott expressed nominal
opposition to the rule, but did not request a roll-call vote on adoption. See id.
at H11,596.
The rule was a critical step in the path to enactment of Public Law 98-620
for two reasons related to the timing of the vote on H.R. 6163. First, the ses-
sion was virtually over, and the offering of amendments would have led to
protracted debate, using finite House time that did not exist. Second, if an
amendment had passed, the amended bill would have had to be returned to
the Senate for further action. Under this latter scenario, the Senate compro-
mise might well have broken down, creating an impasse between the two
houses.
58. See supra note 13. For a chronological outline of the Act's legislative
history, see Metalitz, Legislative Chronology: Semiconductor Chip Protection,
in THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT OF 1984, 189 (J. Baumgarten
ed. 1984).
59. See House Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change, supra
note 1, at 9, 85 (statements of Benjamin M. Compaine, Exec. Dir., Prog. on In-
formation Resources Policy, Harvard University; Fred Weingarten, Prog. Man-
ager, Communication and Information Technologies Program, Office of
Technology Assessment).
In an apt observation to members of Congress, Professor Martin Green-
berger made a similar point:
Technological advance is a driving force and an impetus for change.
But the effects are not just in one direction. Progress in technology is
itself determined and modified by complex social forces interacting
with political and economic interests finding expression in customs
and contracts, legislation and law.
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In politics as in life, change is one of the few things that
society can approach with certainty.6° Technology has acceler-
ated the pace of change far beyond anyone's wildest expecta-
tions. Even copyright lawyers have trouble remembering that
the movie industry is only about seven decades old, the televi-
sion industry is barely into its fourth decade, and in comparison
the integrated circuit or semiconductor industry is relatively
young.6 The evolution of integrated circuits reflects the revo-
lutionary nature of change in our society. In 1959, Jack Kilby
and Robert Noyce independently invented the first semiconduc-
tor chips.62 The microprocessor, or "computer on a chip," was
invented in 1971 by Ted Hoff.63 Robert Noyce himself has ob-
served that progress since invention of the integrated circuit
has been "astonishing, even to those of us who have been inti-
mately engaged in the evolving technology." 64
A short twenty years ago, soon after invention of the inte-
grated circuit, few would have imagined that creators could ex-
press themselves through a silicon wafer: a topography of
intricate layers of materials with designs etched on them, all
told no bigger than a postage stamp. Technology has advanced
so that today, chips are used to operate pacemakers, word
processors, personal computers, pollution control devices, mi-
crowave ovens, blood testing equipment, telephones and other
medical, consumer, and business products. In a remarkably
short time period, the once prescient notion that our "indus-
trial" society was being transformed into an "information" soci-
Congressional Copyright and Technology Symposium, supra note 6, at 213 (re-
marks by Martin Greenberger, IBM Professor of Computer and Information
Systems, UCLA).
60. See W. HURST, THE GROwTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 19
(1950).
61. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5731. As one observer noted: "[W]e used to talk in terms of the rate
of change. I think today it's the rate of the rate of change .... Mhings used
to take decades, then they took years. Now they're taking months and we're
seeing weeks." See Congressional Copyright and Technology Symposium,
supra note 6, at 190 (remarks of Pat Wilson, North American Consumer
Electronics).
62. Wolfe, The Tinkerings of Robert Noyce, EsQuIRE, Dec. 1983, at 346,
358. Jack Kilby used germanium in his semiconductor chip rather than silicon,
which Robert Noyce employed in setting the industry standard. Id.
63. Id. at 371.
64. Noyce, Microelectronics, Sci. AM., Sept. 1977, at 63, 65. Jack Kilby re-
cently observed, "We've come further and faster than anyone expected."




ety has become a cliche.65 Semiconductor chips are at the
center of our information society.
In its consideration of the semiconductor chip legislation,
Congress was not only faced with the societal and economic im-
portance of integrated circuits and the disincentive to innova-
tion created by chip piracy,66 but had to become familiar with
the technological features of the chip and the process by which
chips are manufactured.6 7 Chips, as such, are not accorded pro-
tection under the Act. Rather, "mask works" embodying the
design of semiconductor chip products are granted exclusive
rights. 68 To understand the Act, it is necessary to comprehend
the integrated circuit as well as the painstaking and protracted
creative and manufacturing processes used to design mask
works. A review of the manufacturing process demonstrates
that the chip design process entails sufficient creativity to enti-
tle designs to protection under the intellectual property clause
of the Constitution.69
1. The Semiconductor Chip
As its name implies, a semiconductor is an element or com-
pound that partially conducts electricity. A semiconductor is
intermediate between a conductor, which fully conducts elec-
tricity, and insulators, which do not appreciably conduct elec-
65. Cleveland, In7formation as a Resource, THE FUTURIST, Dec. 1982, at 34;
see also J. NAISBrIT, MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR
LIVES 11-38 (1982) (discussing generally the restructuring of America from an
industrial to an information society).
The House Report on the semiconductor chip legislation noted that:
The fundamental shift from an industrial to an informational society
is no longer just a prediction but is a reality. The majority of the
American workforce is engaged not in the production of goods but in
the creation, processing and distribution of information. Expanding
information technology, from computers to satellites, from television
to teletype, ensures that we will become even more of an information
society in the future. The semiconductor chip is at the vortex of this
new society.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5751.
66. See irnfra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
67. Early in its deliberations, the National Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses of Copyrighted Work (CONTU), created by Congress to provide
recommendations on copyright law revision, similarly discovered that "it
would have to educate itself on the actual and potential technologies and prac-
tices in the two areas [computer software and reprography] of its mandate."
NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONTU FINAL REPORT].
68. For further explanation of mask works, see infra notes 87-91 and ac-
companying text.
69. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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tricity. The semiconductor material most often used today is
silicon.70 Silicon is preferred because the electrical properties
of pure silicon can be precisely controlled by introducing mea-
sured amounts of chemical impurities into the silicon.7 1 In ad-
dition, the surface of silicon can be readily oxidized into an
electrically insulating glaze.
A semiconductor "chip" is simply another name for an in-
tegrated circuit.72 An integrated circuit is basically just a com-
bination of many electrical components on or in a single
substrate, such as silicon.73 A complex of microscopic switches,
functionally transistors, which control electric current, are pat-
terned in and on the chip's silicon base. The switches are then
joined by "wires" etched from extremely thin films of metal or
heavily doped zones of semiconductor material. "Under a mi-
croscope the chip's intricate terrain often looks uncannily like
the streets, plazas, and buildings of a great metropolis, viewed
from miles up."74
The city blocks of a chip are transistors. These transistors
work together to perform assigned electronic functions. The
70. Other semiconductor materials are germanium and gallium arsenide.
Gallium arsenide crystals conduct electricity ten times faster than silicon. Os-
bourne, Business in Space, THE ATL., May 1985, at 45, 47. Due to the volatile
nature of gallium arsenide, these crystals, when grown on earth, suffer serious
imperfections caused by gravitational convective flow. If grown in a gravity
free atmosphere, such as outer space, gallium arsenide crystals can be pro-
duced almost to perfection. Given the vast new horizons opened by the space
shuttle and skylab, new technological possibilities are still unfolding. Id
71. This process is called "doping." Boraiko, The Chip, 162 NAT'L GEO.
421, 434 (1982). For a more extensive explanation of chip technology, see ii;
1979 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 22 (statement of L.J. Sevin, President,
Mostek Corp.); see also 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 21, 30 (state-
ment of F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.)
[hereinafter cited as Dunlap Statement, 1983 House Hearings]. See generally
R. STERN, SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION § 1.1 (1986) (describing generally
semiconductor chip technology).
72. Semiconductor chips can be divided into two broad categories:
microprocessors and memory chips. The microprocessor, often referred to as a
"computer on a chip," has logic circuits that are equivalent to those contained
in the central processing unit of a computer, which enable it to interpret and
execute instructions. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 11, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG & AD. NEws at 5760. A memory chip, on the other hand, stores informa-
tion. This information might be instructions, upon which the microprocessor
will operate, or information which has already been operated on but which
needs to be saved for future computations. Not surprisingly, the functions of a
microprocessor and a memory can be integrated on a single chip. See Dunlap
Statement, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 71, at 22.
73. Noyce, supra note 64, at 64-65.
74. Boraiko, supra note 71, at 421.
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latest generation of chips on the market contains more than
one million transistors arranged on a silicon wafer that is only
a quarter inch on each side, smaller than a baby's thumbnail.75
The small size and integrated nature of a chip are extremely
important.76 Large amounts of time and money are spent try-
ing to put greater numbers of transistors on a single chip. By
1990, engineers hope to squeeze ten million transistors on a sin-
gle chip, "making it as complex as a city nearly 1,000 miles
square."77 A billion-transistor chip may be within technological
reach someday.78
2. Creative Process and Marketing
Several distinct marketing and creative stages, requiring
the talents of many individuals, are generally involved in bring-
ing a new semiconductor chip to market. The intellectual
work, including the imaginative activity, is done by teams. 79
The process usually starts with technology definition. A firm
75. See id. By way of comparison, 5,000 transistors operate a digital
watch; 20,000 are used for a pocket calculator, and 100,000 are necessary for a
relatively small computer. Id. at 429. A pocket calculator contains one hun-
dred times as many transistors as a radio or television receiver. Noyce, supra
note 64, at 63. "Today's chips ... have more computing power, compute
faster, consume far less power, are more reliable, and sell [for substantially
less money] than mainframe computers of the early 1970s." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 20, at 11, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5760 (footnote
omitted).
76. The integrated circuit lacks soldered wires, which reduces the number
of failure points and makes it extremely reliable. Boraiko, supra note 71, at
429. The small size of the chip means that transistors are close together, and
electrical signals must travel only a short distance from switch to switch. See
Marbach, Cook, Willenson, Sandza, Bigney & Foltz, The Race to Build a
Supercomputer, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1983, at 58, 63. A 1,000-transistor chip does
more work, more quickly, than a 10-transistor chip. Boraiko, supra note 71, at
429. Furthermore, smaller chips use less silicon "real estate," allowing more
chips to be produced from a single silicon wafer during manufacture. See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 12, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5761. The end result is a better harvest of good chips at lower cost.
In 1964, Gordon E. Moore predicted that the complexity of the semicon-
ductor chip would double every year. To date, there has not been any substan-
tial departure from what is referred to in the semiconductor industry as
Moore's Law. Noyce, supra note 64, at 65.
77. Boraiko, supra note 71, at 433-34. This would be equivalent to a mega-
lopolis almost twice the size of Alaska. Id. at 434.
78. Id. at 425. "A memory chip of such complexity could store the text of
200 long novels." I&
79. The teamwork demanded in the creative process demonstrates that
the intellectual travail is not dominated by any single "author," and further
reveals a symbiotic relationship between works of the human brain and ma-
chines, as well as computer software, in carrying out the creative process.
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conducts a market study to determine the functions that poten-
tial customers would like performed. The firm can, at this
early stage, preliminarily define physical and electrical charac-
teristics.80 The firm considers potential demand for the prod-
uct, and analyzes the financial horizon.
After the market goals of a chip have been established, a
team of circuit design engineers develops circuits to implement
the desired electronic ideas. The circuit engineers construct a
circuit by making "schematic" representations on paper of the
manner in which transistors must be connected to implement
the appropriate electronic functions.81 The creativity employed
by design engineers is analogous to the task of urban planners
or architects:
[Tihe process may be compared to the work of a city planner who
drafts a plan to build a town in a given location that will have houses,
a school and a shopping center. The planner then hires an architect
to design the town. Blueprints are drawn that specify where the
streets are to be situated, how large the shopping center will be, what
types of houses will be built and other specifics. Eventually, consider-
ation is given to such minor details as the plumbing to be installed in
the individual houses.
82
A team of layout design engineers takes the detailed sche-
matic or logic diagram and determines the most efficient way to
organize it on the chip. Trial and error is used to select the op-
timum layout, and complex computer programs have been de-
veloped to assist in the process.83 Given the tremendous
number of transistors and interconnections that must be posi-
tioned, it is not surprising that the layout stage is time-consum-
ing and extremely costly.84 Ultimately, however, a three-
80. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 12, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5761.
81. See Dunlap Statement, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 71, at 72;
Schrader Statement, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 96-97.
82. See Schrader Statement, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 96-97.
83. See Boraiko, supra note 71, at 433.
Besides plotting transistors, computers also route the interconnections
among them. But no computer can yet calculate, in reasonable time,
the optimum way to wire a VLSI [very large scale integrated] chip:
Possible wiring patterns number in the millions, so complex have chip
designs become. Humans must still... hunt for errors... and...
reroute connections or regroup transistors like building blocks.
Id. Although this may be true for very complex chips, it has become possible
to create chips-even those with a high number of transistors-wholly by use
of computer-assisted design. See Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Com-
petition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REv. 385, 409-10 (1985).




dimensional layout is developed that shows the position of
every transistor and interconnection on the chip. This may be a
"composite" drawing of the various layers of the chip, shown in
different colors on a very large sheet of paper. The same infor-
mation can be recorded in digital form, however, by storing all
of the relevant coordinates of points in the composite drawing
on a magnetic tape known as a "data base tape."a Despite the
progressive automation of the layout process,s8 the technical
skill and creative genius of a chip architect will always be
needed.
3. The Manufacturing Process
Semiconductor chips are frequently manufactured by a
process known as "photolithography" or "masking."8 7 The
three dimensional layout encoded in the data base tape is typi-
cally used to generate a series of stencils called "masks."
Masks are basically glass or metal plates with a pattern printed
on them that has opaque and transparent regions. A number of
different masks used in succession are usually necessary to cre-
ate a chip. Each mask, like a stencil, can be used repeatedly.
To begin the manufacturing process, silicon is melted, puri-
fied, grown into long crystals, and then sliced into thin wafers
and polished. Each wafer is typically a five-inch diameter disk
approximately .025 inches thick. Hundreds of chips are made
simultaneously on each wafer. As described in the House Re-
port,88 the process is as follows:
A silicon wafer is coated with a layer of silicon dioxide, which (unlike
silicon itself) is soluble in hydrofluoric acid. The silicon dioxide layer
is then covered with a thin film of natural or synthetic rubber, known
as "resist," because it resists the action of acid. Over the wafer is then
85. Id. at 12-13, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5761.
86. For the interconnection layers of gate arrays, the process already is
automated. Semiconductor production facilities will in the future be entirely
automated because the delicate task for shrinking chips into microscopic size
(more than one million transistors) will have to occur in a contamination free
environment. The mere presence of a human being could pollute the process.
See Wilson & Ticer, Superchips: The New Frontier, Bus. WK., June 10, 1985, at
82-83.
87. HOUSE REPORT, supr, note 20, at 12, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5761. A new design process, referred to as E-Beam (electron-beam)
technology, is presently being used to create mask works. No masking process
is utilized. E-Beam technology "writes" the layout and interconnection pat-
terns encoded in a database tape directly on a silicon wafer. See SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 44, at 4.




placed a stencil, which typically is a glass mask having opaque and
transparent regions that correspond to one of the patterns of the
mask work. Ultraviolet light is then cast on the mask. The radiation
passes through the transparent parts of the mask but is blocked by
the opaque parts. Where the ultraviolet light contacts the resist, the
rubber is polymerized or "hardened" and becomes relatively insoluble
in organic solvents. As a result, when next the wafer is washed in a
solvent, the unhardened parts of the rubber film are dissolved away,
while the hardened parts remain, leaving the mask pattern laid out in
"resist" on the surface of the wafer. The wafer is then placed in hy-
drofluoric acid, which dissolves away the silicon dioxide that is not
protected by resist. The resist is then removed, and a hill and valley
pattern has been etched into the wafer.
8 9
Additional silicon is then laid down, masked, and stripped.
Chemical impurities or dopants may be deposited to create neg-
ative and positive conducting zones. The manufacture of a chip
usually involves a number of masking steps, each using a differ-
ent mask, and each adding a different layer onto the chip.9° Af-
ter completion of the masking process, the original pure silicon
wafer has been converted into several hundred chips laid out
side by side, like extremely small postage stamps on a mint
sheet. The individual chips are then tested. Acceptable chips
are cut from the wafer with a diamond saw, wired into frames,
and sealed in small plastic or ceramic cases equipped with plug-
in prongs for use in electronic equipment.91
4. The Problem of Chip Copying
The chip industry is capital-intensive and becoming more
so every day. Marketing studies, research and development,
the layout and design processes, and the preparation of the pho-
tographic mask used to manufacture the chip require substan-
tial effort from a squad of engineers and technicians and can
cost millions of dollars. The investment needed to design a sin-
gle new "cutting edge" chip could reach $100 million in the
near future.92 Yet, in three to six months, for a cost of roughly
$50,000 to $100,000, a copyist firm can photograph a chip and its
89. Id.
90. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 13, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5762; see also R. STERN, supra note 71, § 1.I[D] (describing the layer-
ing process in chip manufacturing); Oxman, Intellectual Property Protection
and Integrated Circuit Masks, 20 JURiMETRICS J. 405, 409 (1980) (describing
the layering process in chip manufacturing).
91. See R. STERN, supra note 71, § 1.I[E] (describing the manufacturing
process).
92. See Wilson & Ticer, supra note 86, at 84. The research and develop-
ment costs of a complex chip can reach approximately $4 million. See 1983
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layers and make a perfect copy. 93 For less than $1 million, an
entire family of chips can be duplicated4 The pirate firm,
since it avoids the costs of marketing studies and research and
development borne by the innovating firm, can undersell the
innovator and flood the market with less expensive copies of
the chip, or at least force the innovating firm to reduce the
price at which it can sell its product. Either way, the creative
firm loses revenue and market share. Such appropriation of
creativity thus creates a devastating disincentive to necessary
research and development. Ultimately, innovation, the life-
blood of industry, is jeopardized.95
A potential threat to the economic health of a creative en-
terprise is not, in and of itself, sufficiently serious to warrant
protective intellectual property legislation. Other factors, such
as the efficacy of existing law, the effect of a statutory change
on current law, the parameters of protection, the costs and ben-
efits which flow from new legislation, impact on the public do-
main, and the international aspects of protection must also be
considered. In order to demonstrate precisely why the Semi-
conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 was enacted into law,
the Act must be considered in light of these other
considerations.
II. A POLITICAL TEST FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LEGISLATION
In a constantly changing society such as ours, the legal sys-
tem must be continually restructured to reflect larger changes
that occur outside the law. Any legislative proposals for
change, however, must meet general standards. One such stan-
dard is a common understanding among legislators that statutes
House Hearings, supra note 18, at 65 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, As-
sistant Secretary, Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks Commerce Dep't).
It should be noted that the chip industry has been the beneficiary of re-
search and development (R&D) tax credit legislation, which provides a 25%
tax credit for R&D expenditures which exceed prior year levels. I.R.C. § 30
(West Supp. 1985).
93. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5751; SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 5; see also Dunlap Statement,
1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 66, 75-76; 1983 Senate Hearings, supra
note 20, at 78-79 (statement of Dr. Christopher K. Layton, Vice-President of
Operations, Intersil, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Layton Statement, 1983 Senate
Hearings].
94. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 5.
95. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2-3, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5751-52; SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 5-6.
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should respond to problems. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," is a
familiar statement in the halls of Congress. Furthermore, all
legislation must be subjected to rules of proceeding; otherwise
anarchy will prevail.9 In addition, legislators agree that "wise
legislation will not proceed by deduction from a monistic prem-
ise but upon a series of judgments about ends served and dis-
served by particular measures."97 Not only is wise legislation
well-reasoned and justified, but it should be flexible, to "admit
the variety, and flux of experience, and leave room for ready
correction over time.' 98
Congress applies general policy standards to any proposed
legislation; in addition, Congress can and should apply a consis-
tent and stringent set of standards, tailored to each type of leg-
islative proposal. As regards copyright law, absent another
massive rewriting of the law similar to the 1909 and 1976 revi-
sions, congressional treatment of copyright issues in the 1980s
will be on an incremental and ad hoc basis. Without the appli-
cation of a set of strict standards to a new proposal in copyright
legislation there is a danger that the proposal will creep outside
of the larger copyright scheme, creating an inconsistency with
prior law and causing ramifications for the public and creative
community far beyond the initial error.
Therefore, in the tradition of courts of law and other delib-
erative institutions, the consideration of intellectual property
96. Thomas Jefferson observed long ago:
So far the maxim is certainly true, and is founded in good sense, that
as it is always in the power of the majority, by their numbers, to stop
any improper measures proposed on the part of their opponents, the
only weapons by which the minority can defend themselves against
similar attempts from those in power are the forms and rules of pro-
ceeding which have been adopted as they were found necessary, from
time to time, and are become the law of the House, by a strict adher-
ence to which the weaker party can only be protected from those ir-
regularities and abuses which these forms were intended to check,
and which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to
large and successful majorities ....
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 1, reprinted in RULES
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVF, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 110-11 (1981).
Representative Barney Frank has aptly observed: "The major function of
legislative rules, in my judgmaent, in a functional analysis, is to prevent the
Members from having to vote too often on controversial issues." "Meet the
Legislators," 1985 International Winter Consumer Electronics Show (Las
Vegas, Nev.) 8-9 (Jan. 6, 1985) (unpublished) (remarks of Rep. Barney Frank)
(copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
97. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright: Proposals and Prospects,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 831, 854 (1966); see also L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 228-29 (1968).
98. Kaplan, supra note 97, at 854.
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issues should be governed by standards and procedures that are
understood in advance and applied uniformly from case to case.
At the outset, the proponents of change should have the burden
of showing that a meritorious public purpose is served by the
proposed congressional action.99 Whether the proponents of
change have met this burden can be measured against a polit-
ical test.
Such a political test-a type of "civil procedure" in Profes-
sor David Lange's words'°0°-was implicitly applied to legisla-
tive proposals to extend copyright protection to semiconductor
chips. The test was also used to consider record rental legisla-
tion, the only other amendment to the Copyright Act enacted
into law by the 98th Congress.101 An explicit exposition of the
test may prove useful to proponents of additional changes in
the intellectual property laws. Ultimately, this is the standard
Congress can apply to any proposals before enacting future in-
tellectual property legislation, including changes to the patent
laws.
The test is fourfold in scope.10 2 First, the proponent of a
new interest ought to show that the interest can fit harmoni-
ously within the existing legal framework without violating ex-
isting principles or basic concepts. The proponent must further
indicate whether fundamental aspects of current law, such as
the term of protection and exclusive rights, are compatible with
the protection sought for the new interest. Degradation of cur-
rent law must not be allowed. Where applicable, an advocate of
a new protectable interest should provide a mechanism for
99. See House Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change, supra
note 1, at 64-65 (statement of David Lange, Professor of Law, Duke Univer-
sity) [hereinafter cited as Lange Statement, House Hearings on Copyright and
Technological Change]. A similar burden might appropriately be placed on
those who seek exceptions to protection.
100. Id. at 65.
101. See Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Hearings on HR. 1027, H.R.
1029, and S. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin-
istration of Justice of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 2 (1983-1984) (remarks of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier); Appendix 4, id.
at 723 (statement of David Lange, Professor of Law, Duke University).
The Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727
(1984), amended the Copyright Act to prohibit during a five-year period "the
rental, lease, or lending of phonorecords of copyrighted sound recordings and
musical works for commercial advantage without the permission of the copy-
right owners." See H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 2898, 2903.
102. A similar test is laid out by Professor David Lange in five parts in
Lange Statement, House Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change,
supra note 99, at 57-58, 65-68.
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dealing with the international aspects of intellectual property
law. This is especially true when a sui generis form of protec-
tion is proposed, because it will probably not fall within the am-
bit of existing multilateral treaties. Intellectual property is
international and any system of protection will have to recog-
nize this fact.
Second, the proponent of a new intellectual property inter-
est must be able to commit the new expression to a reasonably
clear and satisfactory definition. The interest should be defined
both in terms of what it is and what it is not. Lack of defini-
tional clarity is unfair to the agency that administers the law
and the courts that interpret it. Further, any legal interest that
cannot be explained to elected members of Congress certainly
should not be scheduled for a vote. Uncertainty in the law is
perhaps most unfair to the public, which must understand the
law to obey and exercise its rights. Proponents must be scrupu-
lously honest on the issue of retroactivity (today's protection
for yesterday's rights) or retrospectivity (tomorrow's protection
of yesterday's rights), because ambiguity affecting the public
domain can wreak havoc with both individual rights and previ-
ously made financial decisions. Additionally, any exception to
the new protectable interest, be it defined in terms of fair use,
reverse engineering, or innocent infringement, must be clari-
fied and reaffirmed.
Third, the proponent of change should present an honest
analysis of all the costs and benefits of the proposed legislation.
The proponent must show the difference between the status
quo and the future contemplated by the legislation. Since we
live in a society of winners and losers, the proponent must also
candidly identify the groups that will bear the adverse conse-
quences of the proposal and explain why they should bear
those losses. The argument that a particular interest group will
make more money and therefore be more creative does not sat-
isfy this threshold standard'0 3 or the constitutional require-
ments of the intellectual property clause.
Fourth, any advocate of a new protectable interest should
show on the record how giving protection to that interest will
enrich or enhance the aggregate public domain.1i 4 The aggre-
103. As a general rule, it is safe to assume that the proponents of change
will derive some benefit from their proposal. The potential benefit provides
the incentive for the proposal.




gate public benefit should outweigh the proprietary gains which
result from protection. Congress can safely move forward if
the cost to the public of the monopoly is deemed to be less than
the value to the public of the total benefits caused by the
law.105
Although Congress did not explicitly apply this four-prong
test when it considered proposals to protect semiconductor
chips, the four factors were implicit in the legislative discussion
of the issue. A review of the product of that debate, the Semi-
conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, demonstrates that it sat-
isfies all four prongs of the test.
A. HARMONY WITH EXISTING LAW
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, by creat-
ing a sui generis and freestanding protection for chip products,
is clearly in tune with the existing framework of copyright law.
The new statutory scheme creates a form of proprietary protec-
tion separate from and independent of the Copyright Act.106
The original proposals to grant protection to semiconductor
chip products under the Copyright Act were fatally flawed. In-
herent in these proposals was a danger that, by tailoring funda-
mental copyright principles to accommodate the unique nature
of the use of chip designs in the manufacturing process, the leg-
islation would distort the way in which copyright was applied
to other categories of copyrightable works.10 7 A representative
105. Lange Statement, House Hearings on Copyright and Technological
Change, supra note 99, at 65-66. The Lange test had its predicates in other ear-
lier works. See Kaplan, supra note 97; Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright
A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); L. RAY PATTERSON, supra note 97; Macaulay, Copy-
right I, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on 5th of February,
1841, Copyright II, A Speech Delivered in A Committee of the House of Com-
mons on the 6th of April, 1842, in PROSE AND POETRY 731-50 (G. Young ed.
1952).
106. By clear and concise language, the Chip Act provides that nothing in
new chapter 9 of title 17 "shall affect any right or remedy held by any person
under chapters 1 through 8 of this title .... or under title 35." 17 U.S.C.
§ 912(a) (Supp. II 1984).
Professor Melville Nimmer, after finding that "the protection afforded in
Chapter 9 is sufficiently analogous to copyright protection, and the issues
raised sufficiently likely to be posed in litigation which also raise copyright is-
sues," has included extensive discussion of the Act in his excellent and useful
treatise. 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 23, § 18.01. For in-depth analyses of the Act
and its contents, see id. §§ 18.01-18.12; R. STERN, supra note 71. The valuable
Stern treatise is devoted entirely to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act.
107. For further discussion of this important point, see HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 20, at 5-11, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5754-60. Eventu-
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of the book publishing industry explained that:
[O]ur concern is not born out of a mere desire for ideologically pure
copyright law,. . . [or an] aversion to innovative legislation. Our con-
cerns do lie with the blurring or distortion of principles and the estab-
lishment of precedents that may have untoward and unintended
consequences for copyright protection of our works, .. and those of
other copyright proprietors.
10 8
This thought was echoed by several other commentators during
the congressional hearings and elsewhere. 1 9
The taproot of the Chip Act is found in the proposition that
dissimilar items should not be similarly treated. A mask work
is not a book or a movie or a record, and therefore is not
treated as these items are under the Copyright Act. 10 The chip
legislation does not treat copyright law as a large tent designed
to protect proprietary interests that reach far beyond its sur-
face perimeter. The Act therefore does not either degrade or
make a mockery of copyright law, as has sometimes been the
case in the past."1
The issue of whether to distinguish mask works from
books or movies for purposes of protection was of major import.
Congress, if it works by analogy, as it often does, must be ex-
ceedingly careful that it chooses the right one." 2 The analogy
that grips the congressional mindset at any particular moment
ally, the semiconductor industry came to appreciate this proposition and
switched its support from a copyright to a sui generis approach.
108. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Jon
Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel to Assoc. of Am. Publishers).
109. Id. at 54 (statement of L. Ray Patterson, Professor of Law, Emory
University School of Law) [hereinafter cited as Patterson Statement, 1983
House Hearings]. Former Register of Copyrights David Ladd, in a study pre-
pared for the World Intellectual Property Organization on the future of copy-
right in the light of changing economic, social and technological conditions,
observed: "the extension of authors' rights and copyright to new kinds of
works must be examined against accepted philosophical and doctrinal princi-
ples so that the historical domain of authors' rights and copyright not be en-
dangered, and that new species of creative works be effectively encouraged."
Ladd, To Cope with the World Upheaval in Copyrigh 1983 COPYRIGHT 289,
291.
110. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5755. Professor David Lange used the following metaphor to illus-
trate the distinction between mask works and books, movies, or records: "[I]f
someone wants to call a garment a vest, he ought to have to produce some-
thing that doesn't have sleeves. If you are going to wear a garment that has
sleeves, then I think you ought to call it something else." Lange Statement,
House Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change, supra note 99, at 56-
57.
111. See Patterson Statement, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 109, at 62-
63; L. RAY PATTERSON, supra note 97, at 225-29.
112. Judge Stephen Breyer has warned: "If you work by analogy, you'd
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is often the analogy that controls the debate.' 13 The outcome of
a vote may depend on acceptance of a false premise, or an at-
tractive but fallacious analogy. As relates to the need to protect
semiconductor chip products, an apt analogy could not be found
in existing copyright law. Consequently, Congress chose not to
force one more camel's nose under an already overcrowded
tent.
The political issue created by the original chip legislation
was therefore larger than the mere question of protectability of
chips. The original proposal to protect semiconductor chip
products under copyright was arguably a "pilot project" for
other new technologies seeking statutory shelter.11 4 Recogniz-
ing that the development of general principles of law and con-
sistent application of those principles are matters of great
import to any developed legal system, the real question for
Congress became one of preserving the integrity of copyright
by maintaining a set of consistent principles.115
In short, the original proposal to protect chip designs
through copyright was not in harmony with existing law. It
would have required distortion of the fundamental principles of
copyright.' 16 Congress recognized that mask works could not
be protected in the same way a book, movie, or record is pro-
tected. For this reason, Congress adopted a sui generis ap-
proach. Sui generis chip protection passed the initial hurdle of
being in harmony with the existing structure of copyright.
better be certain that you have the right analogy, .. ." Congressional Copy-
right and Technology Symposium, supra note 6, at 236.
113. Referring to Judge Breyer's warning, Professor Paul Goldstein charac-
terized false analogies as dangerous, stating "the analogy that grips Congress'
attention will be the one that controls it." Goldstein Summary, id at 167.
114. See Patterson Statement, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 109, at 62.
115. Professor L. Ray Patterson has stated: "While consistency for its own
sake is a virtue of small consequence, consistent principles for a body of law
are essential for integrity in the interpretation and administration of that
law." Id at 54. Although Professor Patterson previously has lamented that
there are "no clearly defined principles for copyright," he nonetheless recog-
nizes the continuing obligation to strive for general principles of law: "It is the
choice of principles that determines whether a legal concept is to have the de-
gree of consistency necessary for a unified whole, or whether it is to consist
primarily of a series of fragmented rules." L. RAY PArERSON, supra note 97,
at 222.
116. For a discussion of the inadequacies of copyright, patent, and state
trade secret laws to protect chips against piracy, see Samuelson, supra note 47,




The Act clearly defines what is and is not protected under
the sui generis scheme. Definitional clarity is important so that
the public and industry understand what is protected and the
duration of protection. In addition, definitional clarity will as-
sist the Copyright Office and the federal courts in applying the
Act.
The Act meets these needs by plainly defining expressions
to be protected and the bundle of exclusive rights to be con-
ferred on owners. Clarity in the definitional and exclusive
rights sections, however, is not the only element of certainty in
the Act. The Act also clearly sets forth a registration require-
ment, a limited ten year period of protection, and an optional
notice provision.
1. What Is Protected
The core of the Act protects "mask works," which are es-
sentially defined as a series of related images that have been
employed to stencil two- and three-dimensional features of
shape and configuration onto a chip, thereby creating a semi-
conductor chip product that potentially will perform electronic
circuitry functions." 7 The mask work must be "fixed" in a
semiconductor chip product for a period, or a time of more than
"transitory" duration." 8 The rights accorded under the Act be-
long to the "owner" of the mask work." 9 The owner is defined
as the "person who created the mask work," his or her legal
representative or transferee, or the employer for whom the
person created the work. 20 The "exclusive rights" that accrue
to the owner are: "(1) to reproduce the mask work by optical,
electronic or any other means; (2) to import or distribute a
semiconductor chip product in which the mask work is embod-
ied; and (3) to induce or knowingly to cause another person to
do any of the acts described [above]."'121 The rights of reproduc-
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
118. The House Report makes clear that fixation of a mask work in a data
base tape (a magnetic tape in which the coordinates of relevant points in a
mask or set of masks is encoded in digital form) does not fit within the defini-
tion of fixation provided by the Act. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 17,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5766.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. II 1984). Use of the term "owner" indicates
that the Act creates an industrial form of property as opposed to an "author's"
right. Earlier versions of the bill used the term "author."
120. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(6) (Supp. II 1984).
121. Id- § 905. Early legislative formulations to protect chips contained a
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tion, importation and distribution are similar to those found in
copyright law.122 The contributory infringement provision does
not have an express statutory analogue in the Copyright Act,
but is derived from case law.123
The Act provides unconditional protection to all mask
works whose owners are nationals or domiciliaries of the
United States or are stateless persons. 24 Similarly, the Act
protects all mask works which were first commercially ex-
ploited in the United States.125 The Act provides possible pro-
tection for mask works of foreign nationals that were not first
commercially exploited in the United States. Such mask works
will be protected if the owner of the mask work is "a national,
domiciliary, or sovereign authority of a foreign nation that is a
party to a treaty affording protection to mask works to which
the United States is also a party,"'' 26 or if the mask work falls
within the scope of a presidential proclamation.2 7 The Presi-
dent is authorized to issue a proclamation conferring protection
more extensive catalogue of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of the mask
work. One of these rights, the "use" right, was found to be slightly duplicative
of the other rights and potentially harmful to the corpus of copyright law
which does not contain such a right. The "use" right therefore was deleted.
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 21 n.40, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5770 n.40; SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 20-21.
122. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5769. The reproduction right finds its ancestry in section 106(1) of the
Copyright Act; the distribution and importation rights have close relatives in
sections 106(3) and 602(a) of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 602(a)
(1982). These rights are also similar to the patent law's exclusive rights to
make and sell the subject matter of a patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154,
271 (1982).
123. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434-42
(1984); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 481-513
(1964). It also is similar to provisions of the patent law codifying previous case
law. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (1982).
The package of exclusive rights created by the Act will be enforced by a
panoply of civil and injunctive remedies, including statutory damages up to the
amount of $250,000, exclusion of infringing products from entry into the
United States, temporary restraining orders, monetary relief for damages and
lost profits, and seizure and impoundment of infringing products. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 910-911 (Supp. II 1984). Criminal penalties, which are not available
under the Act, were not deemed by Congress to be appropriate or necessary
due to the unique nature of the mask work design process, the microscopic
characteristics of semiconductor chip products, and resultant questions of
proof and scienter.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1984).
125. Id § 902(a)(1)(B).
126. Id. § 902(a)(1)(A)(ii).
127. Id § 902(a)(1)(C); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 18-19, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5767-68.
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under the Act upon a finding that a foreign nation extends pro-
tection to mask works of American origin on "substantially the
same basis" as it protects mask works of its own nationals and
domiciliaries, as well as mask works first commercially ex-
ploited in that nation.128 Equality of treatment is not enough,
however. The foreign nation must provide protection that is
substantially equivalent to the protection available under the
United States Act.129
The so-called "formalities" of the American law add clarity
and certainty to the system. Statutory protection under the Act
is lost, and the mask work falls into the public domain, if regis-
tration does not occur within two years after the date on which
the mask work was first commercially exploited anywhere in
the world.130 Failure to respect the two-year window will not
be construed to forfeit any protection that might have occurred
during this time period. When commercial exploitation occurs
first, and the two-year registration window still is open, regis-
tration is still required as a prerequisite to a civil infringement
action.13'
128. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1984). The President was petitioned
under section 902 to issue proclamations extending protection to Great Britain
and Australia. Due to the difficulty of making a section 902 determination,
both petitions were appropriately treated by the Department of Commerce
under the interim and more flexible provisions of section 914. See infra notes
186-200 and accompanying text.
129. For example, a nondiscriminatory foreign law that offered its own and
American citizens alike a one-year period of protection should not qualify for a
Presidential proclamation. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 8, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5757.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (Supp. II 1984).
131. Id § 910(b)(1). The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act became effec-
tive on its date of enactment, November 8, 1984. See id § 913(b). However,
chips that were commercially exploited between July 1, 1983, and November 8,
1984, will receive protection under the Act, provided registration occurred
before July 1, 1985, subject to a two-year compulsory license that permits in-
fringers to continue to sell and distribute their inventory of chip products in
existence on the date of enactment if they agree to and do pay reasonable roy-
alties. See id § 913(d)(1)-(2). On July 1, 1987, all privileges in this regard will
have expired, and any preenactment mask work that qualifies for protection
will be treated identically with one created after the date of enactment. See
id. § 913(d)(2); see also House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 52, at
E4434.
Chips commercially exploited before July 1, 1983, are not protectable
under the Act. Passage of a public law probably would not have occurred ab-
sent an understanding by the House and Senate that the legal status of these
chips, as well as the legality of copying them, rests on statutory provisions in
effect prior to enactment of the Act. Whether under federal law (including
copyright and patent law), state law, or common law, the Act is not intended
to affect any rights available to chip products commercially exploited before
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Protection of mask works is for a period of ten years. The
ten-year term meets both the characteristics of the item pro-
tected and the needs of the public. Protection continues until
the end of the calendar year of the tenth year after registration
or commercial exploitation, whichever occurred first.132
Notice of mask work protection is optional and "is not a
condition of protection."'133 Permissible notice consists of the
words mask work, the symbols *M* or ®; and "the name of the
owner or owners of the mask work or an abbreviation by which
the name is recognized or is generally known."' Although no-
tice is discretionary, it is considered prima facie evidence of the
defendant's knowledge of protection. 135
2. What Is Excluded from Protection
The Act not only defines what creative works deserve pro-
tection; it also delineates areas that are not protectable or are
exceptions to protection. The Act does not protect mask works
that are not "original."'3 As the House Report makes clear,
the meaning of "original" is drawn from the law of copy-
right. 37 The Act will not protect a mask work that "consists of
designs that are staple, commonplace, or familiar in the semi-
conductor industry, or variations of such designs, combined in a
way that, considered as a whole, is not original."as In other
July 1, 1983. See 17 U.S.C. § 912(e) (Supp. II 1984). The House Explanatory
Memorandum states: "When Congress intervenes in an area of new technol-
ogy, it should not weaken any existing rights.... [The] July 1, 1983, chips
are left no better or worse off by this legislation." See House Explanatory
Memorandum, sup-a note 52, at E4434.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp. II 1984). The ten-year period of protection
heeds Thomas Macaulay's admonition that protection "ought not to last a day
longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good." Macaulay,
supra note 105, at 735. Stated differently, society should not pay monopoly
rent in excess of the value of the benefits that flow to proprietors in exchange
for securing the good.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 909(a) (Supp. II 1984).
134. Id. § 909(b).
135. Id § 909(a).
136. Id § 902(b)(1).
137. "This [definition] adopts the essence of the customary copyright law
concept of originality and applies it to mask works, to the extent it is appropri-
ate and feasible to do so." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 17, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5766. For further discussion of the originality standard,
see 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 23, §§ 18.03[B], 18.08-.11. A definition of "origi-
nal" was deleted from the final version of the Act. Compare H.R. 5525, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 901(4), 130 CONG. REc. H5489 (daily ed. June 11, 1984) with 17
U.S.C. § 901(a) (Supp. II 1984).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
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words, the combination of arcs, lines and rectangles in the
mask work must possess the requisite degree of originality
when considered as a whole, even though, if the mask work
were dissected away from the whole it might appear familiar or
commonplace. 139
The proprietary rights granted by the Act are limited by a
number of exceptions. Most significant is the provision that
permits reverse engineering.140 The reverse engineering excep-
tion allows a person to reproduce a mask work "for the purpose
of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques
embodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, or or-
ganization of components used in the mask work.' 141 After
such an analysis or evaluation, the results may be incorporated
"in an original mask work which is made to be distributed."'14
The mature fruit of the reverse engineering process therefore
qualifies for protection under the Act if the originality standard
is met. 43 By allowing the results of reverse engineering to be
used for commercial purposes and by allowing copying of the
entire work, the reverse engineering exception differs dramati-
cally from the "fair use" doctrine of copyright law.'"
139. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5768.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. II 1984). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note
44, at 21-22. To date, the most enlightened commentaries on reverse engineer-
ing are found in W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 340-
46 (1985), and R. STERN, supra note 71, § 5.5.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
142. 1d. § 906(a)(2).
143. "If the resulting semiconductor chip product is not substantially iden-
tical to the original, and its design involved significant toil and investment so
that it is not a mere plagiarism, it does not infringe the original chip, even if
the layout of the two chips is, in part, similar." This explanatory language and
the textual change in § 906 were made at the last moment during the House-
Senate informal conference. See House Explanatory Memorandum; supra
note 52, at E4433; Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 52, at
S12,917. The Mathias-Leahy Memorandum uses the phrase "in substantial
part" rather than "in part," stating that the two works may be "substantially
similar" but that the reverse engineering defense should be withheld if the
two works are substantially identical. See id; see also Letter from Alan H.
MacPherson to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier (Aug. 7, 1984) (copy on file at the
Minnesota Law Review); 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 201 (state-
ment of Robert Hinckley, General Counsel, NEC Electronics U.S.A., Inc.).
144. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 23 n.45, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5772 n.45; SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 22; W. PATRY, supra
note 140, at 342-46. However, an equitable doctrine akin to that of "fair use" in
copyright may develop a life and character of its own under the provisions of
the Chip Act, much as its cousin did under copyright prior to the 1976 Copy-
right Act. A comparison of reverse engineering and fair use suggesting that
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
From a practical standpoint, it should not be terribly diffi-
cult for the federal courts to differentiate between reverse engi-
neering and infringement. The reverse engineering exception
strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of creators
and owners of mask works, on the one hand, and the rights of
teaching and research institutions, competitor firms, users, and
customers on the other. The courts, in deciding whether a re-
production qualifies for a reverse engineering exception, will of
course do so on a case-by-case basis, just as they do in many
other areas of the law, including the "fair use" doctrine in copy-
right.145 The inquiry will be simpler, however, because the ad-
ditional creative work required to fall within the reverse
engineering exception will normally leave a "paper trail" not
found in the files of copyist firms.14
The Act also creates an exception to protection based on
the "exhaustion of monopoly rights" and "first sale" doctrine.
As in copyright law,147 the owner of a mask work does not have
a continuing right to exercise control over the pricing, resale, or
other business conduct of semiconductor chip customers once
the chips have legitimately been procured. The "first sale" doc-
trine serves as a limitation on the importation and distribution
rights of the mask work owner, but does not circumscribe the
reproduction right.148
A third limitation on the exclusive rights of mask work
there are fair uses of a mask work is found in R. STERN, supra note 71, § 5.6.
The Chip Act is silent on these developmental possibilities.
145. See House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 52, at E4433. See
also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
Case-by-case judicial determinations of whether certain actions qualify for the
reverse engineering exception will over time create a body of precedent to be
applied nationwide by the federal courts.
146. HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 21, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5770; SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 22.
As was cogently explained by a representative of the chip industry:
Whenever there is a true case of reverse engineering, the second firm
will have prepared a great deal of paper-logic and circuit diagrams,
trial layouts, computer simulations of the chip, and the like; it will
also have invested thousands of hours of work. All of these can be
documented by reference to the firm's ordinary business records. A
pirate has no such papers, for the pirate does none of this work.
1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 146 Letter from Leslie L. Vadasz to
Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (June 23, 1983).
147. The "first sale" doctrine does not apply to phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 109 (Supp. II 1984).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. II 1984). Without question, the first sale ex-
ception to the Act permits "gray marketing" of integrated circuits by bona fide
purchasers overseas. Gray marketing refers to a process by which goods are
"imported from abroad and sold, frequently at deeply discounted prices,
[Vol. 70:417
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
owners is contained in the innocent infringement section of the
Act.149 If the purchaser of some infringing chips resells them
before ever receiving notice that the chips are protected, the
purchaser is exempted from liability. The innocent infringe-
ment exception applies only to importation and distribution
rights, and not to reproduction.lm5 Furthermore, under the in-
nocent infringement exception, if a person purchases infringing
chips innocently, and then is given notice of infringement prior
to reselling the chips, the innocent purchaser may resell the
chips in question subject to payment of a reasonable royalty to
the mask work owner.151
The innocent infringement provision safely navigates the
turbulent channel between property rights and consumer inter-
ests. On one side, the proprietary interests of chip owners must
be respected as a matter of fundamental fairness and as an in-
vestment incentive. On the other side, innocent parties who in-
vest in chip products should not have their good faith purchases
jeopardized by proprietary rights that could not reasonably be
foreseen.152 Recognizing the tension that exists between these
competing interests, the Act suggests that parties attempt to re-
solve their differences prior to instituting an infringement ac-
tion in federal court.1 53
In sum, the Act defines what creative works deserve pro-
tection; in addition, it delineates areas that are not protectable
or are excluded from protection. The public and industry
should have relatively few problems understanding what is and
is not protected. Furthermore, the Copyright Office and the
federal courts should be able to discharge their respective ad-
ministrative and adjudicative responsibilities with minimal im-
pact on their already heavy workloads.
outside the manufacturer's authorized distribution chain." Riley, 'Gray Mar-
ket'Fight Isn't Black and White, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984).
150. A limited reproduction right for innocent infringers was found in the
bills passed by the House and Senate, but was eliminated from the final ver-
sion of the compromise bill. Compare H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 901(7),
907, 130 CONG. REC. S5489-90 (daily ed. June 11, 1984) and S. 1201, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 511, 130 CONG. REC. S5838 (daily ed. May 16, 1984) with 17 U.S.C.
§§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984).
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984).
152. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 23-25.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 907(b) (Supp. II 1984). The suggested alternatives to litiga-




Any congressional examination of costs and benefits will
not be a litmus test, indicating one color for passage of a bill
and another for defeat. Unlike the preceding analysis concern-
ing harmony with existing law and clear definition of what is
protectable and what is not,154 an analysis of costs and benefits
is more subjective and less quantifiable. This dusty enterprise,
like insulating the attic, is both painful and rewarding;, any itch-
iness is only temporary and the work will result in long-term
benefits.
The semiconductor chip industry has been threatened by
the problem of chip copying.155 Congress, before deciding to
provide protection to a particular enterprise, must necessarily
consider alternative ways in which the industry can or is pro-
tecting itself. Knowledge of the industry gained in such an in-
quiry can indicate whether proposed legislation will involve
costs or benefits for the industry; in addition, the analysis can
provide a frame of reference from which to consider costs and
benefits of protection for society as a whole.
Congressional enactment of patent and copyright laws, or
of any sui generis intellectual property laws, involves a serious
decision because such an enactment creates a limited economic
monopoly. Congressional study of an industry might reveal ef-
fective alternatives to granting monopoly rights, or such study
might reveal that existing law is adequate and no further legis-
lation is warranted. A mere showing that an initial creator's
costs are high, while copying costs are low, is not sufficient to
establish the masonry necessary for protection.'5
The semiconductor industry was not totally helpless
against chip piracy prior to enactment of the chip protection
legislation. 5 7 The initial chip manufacturer enjoyed the built-
in armor of "lead time." By reaching the market first, the orig-
inal manufacturer could develop a pricing strategy that re-
sulted in rapid return of investment. The first chips to come
off the line were highly priced; prices plummeted as chips were
sold. 58 Chip piracy, which at its quickest takes several months,
154. See supra notes 106-153 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
156. Breyer, supra note 105, at 351.
157. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3-4, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5752-53; SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 6-9.
158. Historically, semiconductor chip prices drop 28% to 30% every time
that total output doubles. Noyce, supra note 64, at 2, 7-8; see FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY: A SURVEY OF
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could not affect early sales and the quick recoupment of devel-
opment expenses. Sometimes called "learning curve pricing,"
this strategy's objective was the rapid creation of large demand,
the spurring of cost reductions, the discouragement of competi-
tion, and the avoidance of piracy.15 9 Chips could be sold with
sufficient speed and in large enough quantities to spell the dif-
ference between profit and loss. The piracy attack, which came
later, delivered a serious but not fatal blow. Learning curve
pricing did have significant drawbacks, however; by hampering
the accumulation of capital, the industry suffered some self-in-
flicted harm.160
Although the type of protection semiconductor chips
should receive was ambiguous under law existing before the
STRuCruRE, CONTENT, AND PERFORMANCE 73-83, 139-40 (1977) (stating that in-
dustry executives subscribe to experience curve theory: when output doubles,
costs will decline by a constant percentage and prices will concomitantly drop)
[hereinafter cited as FTC STAFF REPORT]. The price of EPROM (erasable,
programmable read-only memory) chips, useful for storing instructions in a
wide variety of machines, fell 75% in one year. Browning & Yoder, Hitachi
Ltd's Pricing for Semiconductor Prompts Protest by American Offiials, Wall
St. J., June 5, 1985, at 34, col. 3.
159. See Chip Wars: The Japanese Threat, Bus. WK., May 23, 1983, at 80, 83
[hereinafter cited as Chip Wars]; see also FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 158,
at 82 (noting that "[i]n response to declining cost and often in advance of cost
declines, firms tend to cut prices in order to increase their share of the ex-
isting market and in order to create incentives for users to design their semi-
conductors into new products and thus increase the total demand for the
product." This could also be described, however, as an effort to "increase or
retain market share" and "also discourage new entry.").
The learning curve traditionally has related to the on-the-job acquisition
of skills, knowledge and team productivity. After introduction of a new prod-
uct, workers and management learn and hone their respective job skills and
are better able to work together as a team. The result-in principle--is higher
productivity at lower costs as a product goes down its learning curve. Id. at 45-
46.
160. See Chip Wars, supra note 159, at 83. Learning curve pricing is not
likely to disappear in the foreseeable future, as long as there is intense compe-
tition among chip manufacturers. See Browning & Yoder, supra note 158, at
34, col. 3, reporting a decision by Hitachi, found in a memo to its distributors,
to beat all competitor prices for EPROM chips by ten percent. The Hitachi
memo states: "Quote 10% below their price. If they requote, go 10% again.
Don't quit till you win." Id.
At some point, learning curve pricing can become predatory pricing. If
predatory practices can be proved, remedies may lie in either section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1982) (giving the President authority to
take all appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce the rights
of the United States under any international trade agreement or otherwise re-
spond to discriminatory trade practices of other countries) or the Sherman




Act,161 the threat of legal action served as a deterrent to piracy.
Any pirate conceivably faced the inherent cost and delay of liti-
gation, factors exacerbated in controversies arising from tech-
nologically complicated subject matters. Although retaliatory
rhetoric rarely led to the filing of a lawsuit or the commence-
ment of a proceeding before the International Trade Commis-
sion,162 such legal threats did create a favorable climate for
licensing.16 3
161. During consideration of the chip protection legislation, Congress took
no position on the efficacy of copyright law as a basis for protection of semi-
conductor chips. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note
52, at S12,918; House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 52, at E4433-34.
The House Report took a more definite stance, stating that copyright was inad-
equate to provide protection for semiconductor chips. See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 20, at 3-4, 8, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5752-53, 5757
("the Committee notes that the present copyright law does not protect useful
articles, as such, and semiconductor chip products are useful articles, as de-
fined in the Copyright Act"). Nonetheless, suits against alleged "copyists" or
"infringers" had been grounded in copyright causes of action. See, e.g., Layton
Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 93, at 80 (noting that Intersil had
filed suit against a firm that had allegedly copied some of its circuits, based on
a belief that mask designs were protected by federal copyright law).
162. An actual illustration or two suffice to make this point. Zilog, an
American corporation, and Nippon Electronic Company (NEC), a Japanese
firm with an American subsidiary, were able to arrive at a settlement after Zi-
log's charges before the International Trade Commission and in federal dis-
trict court that NEC had copied a microprocessor chip, and in response to
NEC's countercharge that Zilog had violated NEC's patent. Under the terms
of the settlement, NEC received a license to manufacture other Ziog products,
and Ziog received licenses to manufacture specific NEC-designed products.
Zilog Corp. v. Nippon Elec. Co., No. C83-1241 (N.D. Cal. filed March 14, 1983);
Zilog Corp. v. NEC Elec. Co., No. 337-TA-153 (I.T.C. filed June 13, 1983), ter-
minated on the basis of settlemen 49 Fed. Reg. 4856 (1984). Litigation in a
federal court between Intersil and Teledyne also settled. In this case, Intersil
filed a complaint for copyright infringement, unfair competition, and related
causes, alleging that Teledyne had copied an entire family of analog to digital
converter chips. In addition to requesting a preliminary injunction, Intersil
asked the court to award $7 million in actual damages. Intersil, Inc. v.
Teledyne Inc., No. C82-4187 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 7, 1982). For further infor-
mation, see 1983 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 214-15 (statement of Robert
C. Hinckley, General Counsel, NEC Electronics U.S.A., Inc.); Layton State-
ment, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 93, at 80.
163. Data shows that licensing agreements between American and Japa-
nese semiconductor manufacturers increased more than tenfold between 1975
and 1983. See Dataquest Inc., Research Newsletter 5 (March 30, 1984) (unpub-
lished) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review). Licensing practices be-
tween American companies probably increased in a similar manner. The
House and Senate hearing records are devoid of examples of piracy that did
not lead to subsequent licensing arrangements. Time after time, misappropria-




Legal threats were bolstered by the fact that it is exceed-
ingly difficult to copy a chip without detection. Similar to a wa-
termark on a currency bill, the semiconductor chip is so
complex that it has unique identifying characteristics.16
Another factor which served to check piracy to some ex-
tent was the trade negotiations that began in 1980 between Ja-
pan and the United States, the two countries which produce the
most chips and where chip competition is the keenest. These
negotiations arguably resulted in a reduction of piracy between
citizens of the two countries.1 65
Finally, state trade secret laws were available to the chip
industry up to the time the chip was commercially exploited.
As a general proposition, any item of intellectual property can
be a trade secret, provided that the item is not known to others,
is kept secret, and conveys a competitive advantage to the indi-
vidual or entity possessing it.'6 Furthermore, trade secret pro-
tection can last indefinitely. This early line of defense was, and
continues to be, of assistance to the industry before the first
commercial exploitation of the chip.167
A candid appraisal of these defenses against piracy reveals
unique inadequacies in each of them.16s Collectively, they did
not provide effective protection against piracy. Congress has an
164. Integrated circuits have unique "fingerprints" of code that may be
used to identify their design. The unique features of a chip occur either inten-
tionally or as a result of a mistake. The copying of Intel's 8086 microprocessor
several years ago was discovered because two tiny unneeded transistors, dis-
connected and dangling from the chip in a useless bed of silicon, were copied
by a competing firm. See Battling to Innovate and Emulate: Intel Versus Nip-
pon Eectric, Wash. Post, May 2, 1983, at Al, col. 1, reprinted in 1983 House
Hearings, supra note 18, at 38.
165. See Recommendations of the U.S.-Japan Work Group on High Tech-
nology Industries: Semiconductors (Nov. 1983) (unpublished) (copy on file at
the Minnesota Law Review).
166. A trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of infor-
mation which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
167. See Mostek Corp. v. Inmos, Ltd., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 383, 389 (N.D.'
Tex. 1978); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 28-29, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5777-78.
Trade secret laws are not preempted by the Act, as they provide a differ-
ent form of protection from that found in Chapter 9. The continued existence
and efficacy of state trade secret law is doubly important because it provides
protection for chips during a time period, prior to registration or commercial
exploitation, when none is available under the Act.
168. For a discussion of the inadequacies of copyright, patent, and state
trade secret laws in protecting against piracy, see Samuelson, supra note 47, at
487-90; see also supra note 161.
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affirmative obligation to monitor present and future threats to
this country's most creative industries, especially those produc-
ing ideas and information. After finding a threat, Congress can
inform its interest by further examining the costs and benefits
of proposals to eliminate the threat.
Today's economy has a substantial zero-sum element,169
and legislative solutions to the problems of the 1980's must rec-
ognize this fact. As a general rule, in exchange for a benefit
granted to a specific group or industry, some other group must
absorb a loss. Gains accrue to one group, and losses are borne
by another.170 A threshold showing that the industry would
benefit from protection is not sufficient to justify congressional
intervention. Congress's concerns are broader than the con-
cerns of any one industry, and Congress must satisfy itself that
the benefits to society as a whole are outweighed by the costs.
If a legislative solution stimulates economic growth, jobs will
develop and the government's tax base will broaden. In this
manner, the positive impact of a statutory change can exceed
the negative impact. Nonetheless, some losses are inevitable. 17 '
At a societal level, the principal costs of the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act emanate from the granting of monopoly
rights to a chip owner for a ten-year period of time. These mo-
nopoly rights are less than those conferred by copyright law,
both because the term of protection is shorter and because the
169. "A zero-sum game is any game where the losses exactly equal the win-
nings." L. THURow, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 11 (1980). Most sporting events,
for example, are zero-sum games. For every winner there is a loser. As re-
gards economic solutions to our problems--and it is arguable that intellectual
property law is a solution-Professor Lester Thurow argues: "When the eco-
nomic pluses and minuses are added up, the pluses usually exceed the mi-
nuses, but there are large economic losses. These have to be allocated to
someone, and no group wants to be the group that must suffer economic losses
for the general good." Id at 10. Many high-tech industries such as the chip
industry, as contrasted from smokestack industries, are based on an inexhaust-
ible supply of resources. Consequently, the stark reality of the zero sum game
is somewhat lessened.
170. Id at 10-11. Professor David Lange, speaking of copyright, makes a
similar argument:
... it is fair for the copyright law to entertain arguments on behalf
of one industry or another for change. I think those changes ought to
come, however, only if the proponents of the change can show both
why they are entitled to it and why, as against their entitlement,
someone else who may now be benefited by the law the way it is,
ought to have to bear the burden of that change. Because generally,
there is a tradeoff involved.
Lange Statement, House Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change,
supra note 99, at 74.
171. L. THUROW, supra note 169, at 11, 17, 212-14.
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exclusive rights are limited by the reverse engineering and in-
nocent infringement provisions. Still, Congress must be cogni-
zant of the fact that someone might have to pay higher prices
for the protected work-product, which in this case consists of
semiconductor chips. An owner of a monopoly right is allowed
to adopt a marketing strategy that maximizes profits, providing
that the antitrust laws are respected. The Act, by conferring
limited monopoly rights, may well create an atmosphere for
pricing practices that were not previously foreseeable. Chip
prices may rise. Alternatively, consumers might see chips of-
fered at low prices initially, but without dramatic decreases
throughout the product cycle. Learning curve pricing may be-
come a marketing antique. The more probable course is that
learning curve pricing will continue, fueled in part by an over-
riding competitive desire to capture both the domestic and
world markets. The consumer, despite the owner's monopoly,
should continue to reap the benefits of quality products at low
prices due to an extremely competitive, perhaps even preda-
tory, market.172
The lack of opposition to the chip protection legislation
may be a good indication that its costs are low. In a democracy,
when the costs of legislation are expected to be high and a large
number of people are potentially adversely affected, then polit-
ical resistance to a statutory change will occur as a natural
course. The Chip Act was virtually unopposed; not a single
negative vote was cast in either the House or Senate. The vir-
tual unanimity which surrounded the Act allows speculation
that the new law will entail relatively few costs.
The actual implementation costs of the Act, borne by the
taxpayers, are expected to be low. A low-cost forecast for the
Act is supported by the Congressional Budget Office,173 which
estimated net costs of approximately $200,000 per year in fiscal
years 1985 through 1987, and less than $100,000 annually there-
after. 7 4 All of these costs arise from the need to create a regis-
tration system within the Copyright Office.175 Since the Act
172. See supra note 160.
173. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 32 (statement of the Congressional
Budget Office).
174. Id
175. The Register of Copyrights is made responsible for all administrative
functions and duties under the Act. The Copyright Office is directed to estab-
lish a registration system and is authorized to establish rules, including those
relating to fees, notice, deposit requirements, recordation and certification of
registration. See 17 U.S.C. § 908 (Supp. II 1984); see also Final Regulations,
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does not create any criminal penalties, costs will not be borne
by the Department of Justice. Some budgetary impact may be
felt by the Treasury, Postal Service, Customs Service, Interna-
tional Trade Commission, and the federal judiciary. When
compared to the overall budgets of these entities, however, the
cost of implementing the Act will be miniscule.
The interests most seriously affected by the chip legislation
are those of the chip pirates, both present and prospective.
Copyists will no longer be able to take unfair advantage of the
substantial amounts of time and money expended by innovating
firms to develop newer and better chips. Proprietary rights,
however, are tempered by the reverse engineering provision,
which should prevent the Act from affording too much protec-
tion, thereby depriving the public and industry of the benefits
of free and open competition.
Although potential costs to all but copyist firms will likely
be low, the benefits to be derived from the Act are expected to
be great. Semiconductor production is an important and rap-
idly growing segment of the economy.176 The chip protection
legislation rewards and stimulates technological innovation,
which will lead to the creation of more jobs, increased opportu-
nities for investment, augmented tax revenues, and cheaper,
better quality consumer products. Fundamentally, law is a
skeleton providing an inner frame for the ordering of society.177
The Act's main benefit is that it shapes the bones for a rela-
tively new industry, allowing the industry room and protection
to compete and create new designs with foreknowledge of the
basic rules of the game.
In the future, businesses and investors can rely on the fact
that investments in research and development will be pro-
amending 37 CFR, Chapter II, by adding a new Part 211, reprinted in 50 Fed.
Reg. 26,714 (June 28, 1985); Circular R100 (Federal Statutory Protection for
Mask Works) (Copyright Office 1984).
The Copyright Office has reported that as of October 24, 1985, 1774 peti-
tions for registration had been filed. Mask Work Unit Statistics, provided by
Dorothy Schrader, General Counsel, Copyright Office (Oct. 24, 1985) (copy on
file at the Minnesota Law Review).
176. The International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Com-
merce, forecasts that in 1985 the industry will ship more than $20.5 billion of
semiconductor devices. Moreover, the semiconductor industry is expected to
continue its 20% rate of annual growth through 1990. See 1985 U.S. INDUS-
TRIAL OUTLOOK 32-3; see also Wilson & Ticer, supra note 86, at 84. Over the
years, the United States Government has been the largest single buyer of inte-
grated circuits and products containing integrated circuits (principally for de-
fense, aerospace, and information processing).
177. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 139 (1921).
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tected, and that innovating firms will be rewarded for their ef-
forts. The Act will benefit the public by rendering accessible
the works of creators. Technological innovation will continue,
and jobs will be created, resulting in improved quality of life
for all Americans. The tax revenues generated by the aug-
mented prosperity of the chip industry will more than offset
the actual taxpayer costs of the legislation. Perhaps more im-
portantly, the public domain will benefit in several important
regards.
D. ENHANCEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
More than a nodding acquaintance with the concept of pub-
lic domain is essential to comprehension of intellectual prop-
erty law and the role of the United States Congress in creating
that law. The addition of a creation to the public domain is an
integral part of the social bargain inherent in intellectual prop-
erty law. It is one of the general benefits received by the public
in return for providing protection to authors and inventors. It
should not be viewed simply as a form of punishment imposed
on authors and inventors when for some reason, such as failure
to respect formalities, they lose control of their creations.
Viewed another way, "the public domain is the accumulated
wisdom of the ages."'178
A creation can enter the public domain in a number of
ways. First, the material may fall outside the ambit of the in-
tellectual property clause of the Constitution. Alternatively,
the material may fall outside the ambit of the intellectual prop-
erty statutes, even though it is theoretically within the scope of
constitutional protection. Congress may decide not to protect
all the material it is constitutionally permitted to protect. Ad-
ditionally, the material may not be given protection for proce-
dural or formal reasons. Untimely applications or items
already within the public domain that do not receive retroac-
tive protection fall within this category. Finally, the material
may be in the public domain because its term of protection has
already expired, thereby making it free for all to use. The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act adequately addresses these
178. P BROWN & B. KAPLAN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
AND OTHER ToPics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND
ARTISTIC WORKS 3 (3d ed. 1978). For an insightful analysis of the concept of
public domain, about which very little has been written, see Lange, Recogniz-
ing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONT. PROB. 147 (1981).
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various facets of the public domain in defining what interests
are protectable.
From a constitutional standpoint, mask works are pro-
tected as "writings" within the Constitution's intellectual prop-
erty clause. 179 By limiting protection to mask works, and not
the actual chip itself, the Act does not create a shelter larger
than the supporting walls of the Constitution. Any material
that fails to qualify as a writing does not receive protection
under the Act. Furthermore, chips that are not "original" do
not receive protection. 80 Chips may lack the requisite original-
ity either because the chips contain staple or commonplace de-
signs, or because they have designs that are staple,
commonplace, or familiar in the semiconductor industry, com-
bined so that they are not original when considered as a
whole.' 8 '
The Act also addresses the issue of retroactivity. Those
chips commercially exploited prior to July 1, 1983, are not pro-
tected. 8 2 These chips remain in the public domain to the ex-
tent they were in the public domain prior to the Act's passage.
Moreover, the Act does not protect any subject matter that,
although protectable, previously failed to meet any standard of
formalities, such as notice or registration, prior to enactment. 83
In this latter regard, the new statute is not a private relief bill.
Furthermore, because the Act establishes a sui generis
form of protection, it does not affect subject matter that previ-
ously fell under intellectual property protection, and for which
a limited term of protection has tolled.
From a larger political perspective, the greatest betrayal of
the public domain that could ever occur is that Congress would
confer protection above and beyond that necessary to stimulate
a desired creative activity. Such an error could happen if pro-
tection is vague, excessive, unjustified, or misconceived.'84 The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act is not excessive in terms of
the rights conferred. In theory, the Act should benefit the pub-
lic domain over the long term. Prior to enactment of the Act,
179. See House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 52, at E4433.
180. See ii at E4432; supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 131.
183. Although the Act confers protection on chips commercially exploited
on or after July 1, 1983, this provision is retrospective and not retroactive. See
17 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp. II 1984).
184. Lange Statement, House Hearings on Copyright and Technological
Change, supra note 99, at 64.
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insufficient protection coupled with a capital intensive industry
vulnerable to piracy created a distinct danger of reduced inno-
vation and creativity by the semiconductor industry. Statutory
protection under the Act provides an incentive for industry to
take risks, commit resources, engage in research and develop-
ment and ultimately to share the products developed with con-
sumers. Over time, remembering that each integrated circuit
qualifying for protection receives protection for a relatively
short term of ten years, the public domain will be enriched.185
III. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although the international ramifications of semiconductor
chip legislation were not incorporated in the political test for
the legislation, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act was pro-
gressive in its attention to international concerns. This prece-
dent suggests that any proponent of a new intellectual property
interest will have to expressly consider the burgeoning interna-
tionalization of intellectual property law.
International protection for chips would ideally have been
based on multilateral treaty obligations, as is the case for pat-
ents, trademarks, and copyrights. Since the United States was
the first country to create a sui generis form of protection,
however, a unilateral scheme of international protection was
the only recourse.
The Act sets forth an "international transition provision"
which creates a favorable climate for other countries to develop
their own chip protection legislation.186 This provision, devel-
185. Any conclusion that an enlargement of proprietary rights will enrich
the public domain is not easily made. One must remember that "[ilt is the
public domain that... is most seriously threatened when new technology and
new ideas for protection in new technology are raised." Id at 56.
As for creation of a new right, the public domain is a positive entity better
defined in terms of what it is as opposed to what it is not. Professor David
Lange discusses the relationship between public and private interests in these
words: "[N]o exclusive interest should ever have affirmative recognition un-
less its conceptual opposite is also recognized. Each right ought to be marked
off clearly against the public domain." Lange, supra note 178, at 150. Applica-
tion of a "burden of persuasion" test to the proponents of new forms of intel-
lectual property, as has been done in this article, shows if nothing else that the
public domain is not a mere abstraction but is a subject of great import to the
policymaker.
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 914 (Supp. II 1984). The Act has firm roots in the
proposition that intellectual property law, to be viable in the years ahead,
must be international in scope.
The importance of international law to intellectual property and its rele-
vance to the policy maker has been noted by former Register of Copyrights
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oped cobperatively by the Senate and House during negotia-
tions for reconciliation of the differences between each
chambers' bills,18 7 is significant both in terms of American in-
tellectual property law and in terms of world trade and foreign
affairs. During Senate floor debate, Senator Mathias aptly
observed:
The United States will be the first country to adopt legislation explic-
itly protecting chip designs against unauthorized copying. As the
trailblazers, we must grapple with the question of how to treat those
other nations that may wish to follow us down the path of chip pro-
tection. In the global market in which semiconductor chip products
move, few questions are of greater importance.188
The Act responds to these concerns by authorizing the Sec-
retary of Commerce to extend to foreign nationals, on an in-
terim basis, the right to obtain chip protection under the Act. 8 9
In making a decision, the Secretary is bound under the Act to
find that the foreign nation in question is progressing-either
by enactment of a statute or by treaty negotiation-towards a
legal regime of mask work protection generally similar to that
found in the Act; that its nationals and persons controlled by
them, such as subsidiaries or affiliated companies, are not en-
gaging in and have not recently engaged in chip misappropria-
tion or the sale of products containing infringing semiconductor
chip components; and that issuing the order would promote the
overall goals of the Act and international comity with respect
to the protection of mask works. 190
The Secretary may exercise his decision-making authority
upon his own motion or in response to a petition of any person.
The Secretary's order is to be made in an informal rule making
proceeding, reviewable under the Administrative Procedure
Act for abuse of discretion. In order to ensure maximum legis-
lative oversight of the Secretary's actions in this regard, the
David Ladd: "In the hurly-burly of change, policy-makers must continuously
and carefully not only watch and assess how various countries try to cope, but
also search for new international solutions to increasingly international
problems." Ladd, supra note 109, at 290 (emphasis in original); see also Stew-
art, International Copyright in the 1980s, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF U.S.
351, 351 (1980-1981); D. Ladd, Securing the Future of Copyright-A Humanist
Endeavor, Remarks Before the International Publishers Association (Mexico
City, Mexico) (March 13, 1984) (unpublished) (copy on file at the Minnesota
Law Review).
187. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying-text.
188. 130 CONG. REC. S12,924 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.).




Secretary's power is terminated or, in common congressional
parlance, "sunsetted" after three years.191 The Secretary must
also report to the Congress within two years concerning the
progress being made in the direction of international comity re-
garding mask work protection, and delineate what further
steps, if any, are deemed appropriate. 192 Pursuant to the stat-
ute, the Secretary has delegated his responsibility in this regard
to the Assistant Secretary and Commissioner for Patents and
Trademarks. 193
Japan was the first country to apply for interim protection
under section 914. In response to the Japanese petition, which
noted that Japan had enacted a sui generis bill similar to the
American law, the Department of Commerce issued an order
extending one year of interim protection under the Act.194 For
all intents and purposes reciprocity now exists between the two
countries that produce approximately ninety per cent of the
world's semiconductor chips.195 Recently, petitions from Swe-
den, the Netherlands, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and the Commission of the European Communities on behalf of
the European Economic Community were filed with the Secre-
tary of Commerce. 1' All received favorable dispositions.197
191. See idi § 914(e).
192. Id- § 914(d)(2). For further information on this important section, see
House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 52, at E4434; Mathias-Leahy Ex-
planatory Memorandum, supra note 52, at S12,919.
193. See Exec. Order No. 12,504, 50 Fed. Reg. 4849 (1985) (Amendment 1 to
Department Organization Order 10-14).
194. See In re Japan (Oct. 22, 1984), reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 12,357 (Mar.
28, 1985) (Petition of Akio Morita on Behalf of the Electronic Industries Asso-
ciation of Japan (EIAJ) under Section 914(a) of the Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act of 1984); Interim Protection for Mask Works of Japanese Nationals
Domiciliaries and Sovereign Authorities, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,668, 24,669-70 (June
12, 1985). EIAJ represents the major semiconductor manufacturers based in
Japan.
On May 24, 1985, Japan's Diet enacted "An Act Concerning the Circuit
Layout of a Semiconductor Integrated Circuit," which provisionally has been
assigned Law No. 60-63. The Japanese legislation has been described as being
a "dead copy" of the American Act: "It is fortunate that U.S. Government
documents are not eligible for copyright protection, because the U.S. Congress,
if it were so disposed, might have a good claim that its Act has been infringed
upon. Then again, perhaps it is simply a slick job of reverse engineering."
Statement of Robert S. Schwartz on behalf of the Electronic Industries Associ-
ation of Japan (EIAJ) Before the Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks (May 8, 1985) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
195. Interim Protection of Mask Works of Japanese Nationals Domiciliar-
ies and Sovereign Authorities, reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 24,668, 24,669 (June
12, 1985).
196. See Petition to the Secretary of Commerce to issue an Order ex-
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The adoption of legislative schemes in other industrialized
countries, providing protection to chip designs in roughly the
same manner as in the United States, creates a favorable cli-
mate for continuing cooperation on a wide array of intellectual
property issues.
A neutral observer has to be impressed with the dispatch
and substance of these bilateral developments. Prior to enact-
ment of the American law, Akio Morita, the President of the
Electronic Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) and Chair-
man and Chief Executive Officer of the Sony Corporation,
wrote that passage of legislation by the United States Congress
was "highly desirable, both [in and] of itself and as an indica-
tion of the proper direction for the international protection of
such intellectual property. ' 198  His words have proven
prophetic.
On the multilateral level, cooperation is similarly flourish-
tending the privilege of making interim registration for mask works (April 12,
1985), (submitted by the Federation of Swedish Industries) reprinted in 50
Fed. Reg. 18,720, 18,721-22 (May 2, 1985); Interim Protection for Mask Works
of Nationals, Domiciliaries and Authorities of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,666 (June 12, 1985); Interim Pro-
tection for Mask Works of Nationals, Domiciliaries and Sovereign Authorities
of Australia, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,665 (June 12, 1985); Petition from the Govern-
ment of the Netherlands (June 3, 1985), reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 24,795,
24,796 (June 13, 1985); Petition to the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to Sec-
tion 914 of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act from the Canadian Manu-
facturers' Association et al. (June 12, 1985), reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 25,288,
25,289 (June 18, 1985); Petition from the Commission of the European Com-
munities on behalf of the European Economic Community (June 20, 1985), re-
printed in 50 Fed. Reg. 26,821, 26,882 (June 28, 1985).
197. To date, Sweden has received one year interim protection (50 Fed.
Reg. 25,618, 25,619 (June 20, 1985)); Australia has received one year (50 Fed.
Reg. 26,818, 26,820 (June 28, 1985)); Great Britain and Northern Ireland three
years (50 Fed. Reg. 26,818, 26,820 (June 28, 1985)); the Netherlands one year
(50 Fed. Reg. 26,818, 26,820 (June 28, 1985)); Canada one year (50 Fed. Reg.
27,649, 27,650 (July 5, 1985)); and Member States of the European Economic
Community one year (50 Fed. Reg. 37,892, 37,894-95 (Sept. 18, 1985)).
198. See Letter from Akio Morita to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier (July 18,
1984) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review). In his letter, Mr. Morita
referred to the joint recommendations of the United States-Japan Work Group
on High Technology Initiatives (Nov. 1983), see supra note 165:
Both governments should recognize that some form of protection to
semiconductor chip producers for their intellectual property is desira-
ble to provide the necessary incentives for them to develop new semi-
conductor products. And both governments should take their own
appropriate steps to discourage the unfair copying of semiconductor




ing. While there is little disagreement that any sui generis ap-
proach to mask work protection falls outside the shadow of
protection cast by the Universal Copyright Convention and the
Paris Convention, positive movement towards a new form of in-
ternational protection has nonetheless already begun. Dr.
Arpad Bogsch, Director General of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), recently inquired "whether a
multilateral treaty would not, in the long run, be a safer, sim-
pler response to the need of protection on the international
level."' 99 WIPO already has held informal consultations with
experts from Australia, West Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. A more formal meeting has
occurred at which a broader expanse of world governments, in-
cluding the Third World, have been represented.200 Drafting of
a new multilateral convention has already commenced and the
holding of a diplomatic Conference is a distinct possibility.201
CONCLUSION
Let us now, in Macaulay's words, "descend from these high
regions where we are in danger of being lost in the clouds, to
firm ground and clear light."202 The Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act does indeed leave us on dry land with solid footing
underneath. The swamp is nowhere to be seen. This endeavor
shows that application of a consistent and stringent set of stan-
dards to intellectual property proposals is feasible; advocates of
change, if pressed, can satisfy their heavy burden of proof. The
proponents of proprietary protection for semiconductor chip
products showed, and Congress found, that a meritorious public
purpose would be served by legislative action. The Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act is consistent with current intelec-
tual property law. Copyright is not a large circus tent equipped
to cover diverse and unrelated rings. The Act does not suffer
199. Speech of Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Mid-Winter Meeting Institute of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (Dorado, Puerto Rico) (Jan.
28, 1985) reprinted in AIPLA Bull 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1985).
200. On November 26-29, 1985, a "Committee of Experts on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits," representing thirty countries, met
in Geneva, Switzerland. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Draft
Report (Nov. 29, 1985) (unpublished) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Re-
view). Another meeting is scheduled for late-summer 1986.
201. On June 28, 1985, WIPO distributed a draft treaty to the Committee of
Experts. World Intellectual Property Organization, Draft Treaty on the Pro-
tection of Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (June 25,
1985) (unpublished) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
202. Macaulay, supra note 105, at 733.
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from "distortion by shoehorn." 20 3
Forcing protection for utilitarian articles into copyright
would actually have weakened the fabric of copyright law,
stretching copyright beyond its philosophical and conceptual
limits. Theoretical emptiness at the center of copyright law ul-
timately would contribute to instability, making it a ship with a
great deal of sail but a very shallow keel, vulnerable to the
winds of economic pressures or technological changes. The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act deepens the keel, adding
stability to the boat. Current copyright law is stabilized and
possibly even strengthened.
A sui generis approach preserves copyright, and protects
mask works: the best of all possible worlds. The rights and re-
sponsibilities created by the Act are concisely defined and not
overbroad. The packet of rights created is appropriately cir-
cumscribed by several key exceptions, including reverse engi-
neering, innocent infringement and first sale, and is then
further limited by a shorter term of protection and a registra-
tion requirement. The proponents of change presented an hon-
est and candid analysis of the costs and benefits of their
proposal. Sui generis protection for mask works did not sub-
vert the social bargain inherent in all intellectual property law.
Rather, the public domain is fortified and enhanced by several
aspects of the Act. Ultimately, the advantages of the Act
clearly outweigh the disadvantages.
The Act also manifests the burgeoning internationalization
of intellectual property law in the information era. Ideally, in-
ternational mask work protection would have been established
upon multilateral treaty obligations; and, as is the case for pat-
ents, trademarks and copyrights, such alliances should be an in-
tegral and working part of international law. Since the United
States was the first country to protect clearly mask works in
specific implementing legislation, Congress had no recourse but
to create a unilateral scheme that hopefully will spawn a move-
ment towards first bilateralism and then multilateralism. Bi-
lateral and multilateral developments have already occurred
with rapidity since enactment of the Act.
The Act teaches a number of other important lessons. The
first lesson is that Congress is institutionally capable of con-
fronting difficult problems posed by new technologies. Admit-
203. This phrase was coined by Commissioner John Hersey, and concerned
copyright protection for computer software. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supr
note 67, at 27, 31 (dissenting views of Commissioner Hersey).
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tedly, "[1egislation ... involves the difficulties and the perils
of prophecy. ' '2°4 In the legislative process, "[ilt is easier to ac-
cept situational pressures toward drift and inertia than to labor
to formulate issues and muster support of interested parties to
get a bill drawn and pressed to final passage."205 The lawmak-
ing process is full of risks and is very time-consuming, problems
which are exacerbated by the rules of the legislative process,
human nature and our complex society. Congress could have
chosen not to examine the questions raised by the proposed
chip legislation. In a spirit of optimism, however, a decision
was made to move ahead and meet the future. The initial les-
son of the Act, therefore, is that Congress can be trusted to
consider issues arising from technological developments and to
craft appropriate solutions conferring statutory protection on
the creative work-product of new technologies.
The Act's second lesson is that Congress can and should
weigh equities between the public interest and proprietary
rights. Intellectual property law presents lawmakers with a
delicate job of bartering between what are often contrary inter-
ests.206 There is always the danger of striking a bad bargain on
behalf of the public. Choices are not impossible, however; the
delicate balancing of interests is both possible and preferable.
Federal courts and the Copyright Office should keep firmly in
mind the overall balance struck by Congress as they confront
problems that arise under the Act.20
7
Third, the Act reveals that increasingly proffered argu-
ments that the gusty wind of public opinion is the greatest
threat to intellectual property law, especially copyright, 208 are
insubstantial. The enunciated fear, put in a stark electoral per-
spective, is that there are more voters on the consumer side of
any copyright issue than on the proprietary side. Consumer
politics, so the argument goes, is an insidious threat to copy-
right.20 9 Long ago, however, at the birth of this Nation,
204. R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw 45 (1938).
205. Hurst, Legal Elements in United States History, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1971).
206. Through the looking glass of this article, we have seen that "[a]ll gov-
ernment, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and pru-
dent act, is founded on compromise and barter." E. Burke, Speech on
Conciliation with America (March 22, 1775), in 2 WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE
169 (1881).
207. For a similar thought, see Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Col-
lection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1605 (1963).




Thomas Jefferson observed that "the people are the only sure
reliance for the preservation of our liberty. '210 Just as we can
rely on the citizenry to protect our fundamental liberties, so too
can we feel confident that the electoral process will preserve
and protect intellectual property, and create new forms of pro-
tection if they are necessary. Liberty and property are not in-
compatible.211 The framers of the Constitution, by placing the
intellectual property clause in Article I of the Constitution and
thereby allocating lawmaking power to the most representative
of the branches of government-the legislature--determined
that promoting the progress of science and the useful arts could
occur through a democratic decision-making process. The Chip
Act shows the wisdom of that historic decision; Congress stands
ready to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
The citizenry and consumers of this country will not oppose
new forms of proprietary protection if the public interest is
well-served.
A fourth lesson of the Act is its confirmation of the propo-
sition that any history of an American law is really nothing
more than an assessment of American society.212 The legal sys-
tem cannot anticipate change; to the contrary, law is a mirror
held up against life. The Chip Act appropriately brings an ex-
citing new technology into the mainstream of the American
legal system. The law now reflects present day technology,
with sufficient flexibility to meet the foreseeable needs of the
future.
Last, and most important, the Act has precedential value
for other new technologies. The chip legislation is the first sig-
nificant expansion of intellectual property in over a century.
The fundamental import of the Act is that industrial property
is recognized as a right. Already described as radical in ap-
proach,213 the Act paves the way for consideration of unique
and special forms of protection for scientific advances that fall
outside the protection of traditional patent and copyright
laws.2 14 Recent strides in the fields of artificial intelligence,
molecular and genetic engineering, information processing,
210. 2 THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 501 (J. Foley ed. 1969) (Letter to
James Madison, 1787).
211. See Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPY-
RIGHT SoC'Y 421, 426 (1983).
212. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 595 (1973).
213. Samuelson, supra note 47, at 472.
214. See Stern, An Overview of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984, in THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT OF 1984, 109, 110 (J.
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computer software, and telecommunications also provide fertile
ground for future congressional scrutiny and oversight.2 15 Un-
contestably, legislation previously enacted to respond to new
Baumgarten ed. 1984); see also Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1985, at A14, col. 1 (semicon-
ductor chip no longer in "limbo").
Since 1914, Congress has not acted favorably on bills to create sui generis
copyright protection for ornamental designs of useful articles. See, e.g., Regis-
ter of Copyrights, Draft, Second Supplementary Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (Chap. VII)
(1975) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review); see also H.R. 1900, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REC. H1837 (1985) (introduced by Representative
Carlos Moorhead and adding a new chapter 10, entitled Protection of Indus-
trial Designs of Useful Articles, to title 17, United States Code). See generally
Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative
View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y OF U.S. 267
(1984); Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J.
1143.
As a general proposition, ornamental designs do not involved new technol-
ogies. Therefore the Chip Act has little precedential value for proposals to
create sui generis protection for designs. At the very least, however, one can
state that sui generis protection for utilitarian semiconductor chips creates a
statutory breach in the wall that previously did not exist. It now might be eas-
ier for protection of industrial designs of useful articles to follow, bearing in
mind of course the dangers of false analogies. See Congressional Copyright
and Technology Symposium, supra note 6, at 237 (statement of Judge Stephen
Breyer); Goldstein Summary, id. at 167.
215. Professor Paul Goldstein, summarizing the learning of the congres-
sional symposium on copyright and technological change, poses a question and
offers a response:
Is copyright the appropriate vehicle for protecting software? Copy-
right law's traditional design has evolved over centuries to meet quite
different needs, and may not be appropriate to this subject matter.
Copyright might, for example, offer more protection than is needed in
some respects, and less than is needed in others.
Id. at 167. For a similar conclusion, see Samuelson, supra note 23, at 769.
The President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness has remarked
on the implications of the Act:
The semiconductor chip development illustrates one approach to leg-
islation to deal with new technologies. Indeed, it points to the need to
rethink and broaden our concepts of protectable intellectual property.
This goes hand-in-hand with the growing recognition that knowledge
itself, however embodied, has economic value. Although the applica-
tion of our intellectual property rules has been adjusted over time in
response to changing commercial practice and evolving technologies,
the continuing outburst of the new scientific advances calls for re-
thinking the very concepts derived from earlier centuries on which
those rules are based. New concepts of what intellectual property is
and how it should be protected-beyond patents, trademarks, trade
secrets, and copyrights-may well be needed, as may sweeping
changes in intellectual property laws, and how they are administered
and enforced.
RESEARCH, DEV. AND MGMT. COMM., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS. COMPETI-
TIVENESS, PRESERVING AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS: A SPECIAL
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technologies "should be subject to a periodic review to deter-
mine its adequacy in the light of continuing technological
change, ' 216 and the political test underlying the Act provides
one way of assessing the merits of any legislative proposals to
address such changes.
The United States, in the age of information, will increas-
ingly rely on technical fields and new technologies in which un-
conventional and unforeseen kinds of property are created.
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act demonstrates that the
enactment of a sui generis form of protection is possible and in
fact provides the most equitable balance between public and
proprietary interests.
REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (released
Feb. 19, 1985) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
216. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 2.
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